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Go to the Mall with My Parents?? A
Constitutional Analysis of the Mall of
America's Juvenile Curfew*
I. Introduction
The Mall of America (the "Mall"), located in Bloomington,
Minnesota, could only exist in the United States. With 4.2 million
square feet of gross building area,' it is the largest retail and
entertainment center in the country.' Since its opening on August
11, 1992, the Mall has become a tremendous tourist magnet for
Americans and foreign visitors alike.' The Mall is a living,
breathing monument to American consumerism and to the
collective fulfilled desire for a shopping experience that is as
convenient, all-encompassing, and as efficient as possible. Conven-
ient is certainly the operative word as the Mall contains infant care
facilities, a high school, a college, a United States Post Office, a
* Author's note: Shortly before this comment was published, a decision from the
Minnesota Court of Appeals, adverse to the central thesis of this comment, was handed
down. See Minnesota v. Wicklund, No. C7-97-1381, 1998 WL 156240 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr.
7, 1998). The court of appeals, reversing the trial court, held that the free speech provision
of article I, section 3 of the Minnesota Constitution does not apply to the Mall of America.
Nevertheless, this comment argues for an expansion of the state's protections of individual
liberties under article I, section 16 of the Minnesota Constitution.
1. See PUBLIC RELATIONS DEP'T, MALL OF AMERICA, AT A GLANCE (1996)
[hereinafter AT A GLANCE]. Unless otherwise stated, all of the Mall's promotional materials,
as well as two 1996 press releases, are based on promotional material provided by the Mall
of America. The promotional material consisted of nine glossy 8 x 11" sheets that detailed
the Mall's variety of offerings (i.e. "Tourism" and "Restaurants & Nightclubs"); three
brochures: "Map and Directory," "Dining and Entertainment Guide," and "The Place for
Fun in Your Life;" and two press releases dated September 4, 1996 and October 8, 1996.
The information packet was requested in early October 1996 and was received on October
11, 1996. An updated information package was received on October 20, 1997, and references
to the 1997 information are noted herein.
2. See PUBLIC RELATIONS DEP'T, MALL OF AMERICA, DESTINATION PLANNING
GUIDE, 1997-1998, 2 (1997) [hereinafter DESTINATION PLANNING GUIDE].
3. Over 190 million people have been to the Mall since its opening. See AT A
GLANCE, supra note 1. Visitors from outside a 150 mile radius account for greater than 30%
of the Mall's visitors. See id. International visitors account for 6%. See PUBLIC RELATIONS
DEP'T, MALL OF AMERICA, TOURISM (1996) [hereinafter TOURISM]; AT A GLANCE, supra
note 1.
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bank, a hotel, a dental clinic, and a myriad of other non-shopping
services.4  Not only do the 520 shopping stores5 under one roof
provide for an efficient one-stop shopping experience, but the Mall
has other types of attractions-including entertainment and
dining-for practically every taste.6
Not surprisingly, teenagers frequent the Mall of America.
Like their counterparts around the country, Minnesota teens
regularly go to the Mall on weekend evenings. Estimates hold that
between two and three thousand teenagers frequent the Mall of
America on both Friday and Saturday evenings.7 Many, if not
most, go to the Mall because there is little else to do in the
community on weekend evenings and because the Mall is a good
place to see and be seen.8 Due to its size, the Mall is thus faced
with a proportionately larger group of teen visitors than are other
malls across the nation.
Mall of America management initiated a number of creative
solutions to handle teen conduct-related issues.9 However, after
4. See PUBLIC RELATIONS DEP'T, MALL OF AMERICA, MAP AND DIRECTORY (1996)
[hereinafter MAP AND DIRECTORY]; DESTINATION PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 2. For a
detailed discussion of the services the Mall offers its visitors, see infra text accompanying
notes 107-13.
5. See AT A GLANCE, supra note 1.
6. Youth entertainment includes Knott's Camp Snoopy, LEGO Imagination Center,
and StarBase Omega. See PUBLIC RELATIONS DEP'T, MALL OF AMERICA, FAMILY FUN
(1996) [hereinafter FAMILY FUN]. For further information on these amusements, as well as
adult and family-oriented attractions, see infra text accompanying notes 97, 115-19.
7. See Robyn Meredith, Big Mall's Curfew Raises Questions of Rights and Bias, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 4, 1996, at Al.
The importance of teen spending in United States commerce is evidenced by the fact
that teenage spending in the United States is estimated at over $100 billion. See Leyla
Kokmen, Hang Time-Mall of America Withdraws Welcome Mat to Teens Who Gather on
Weekends, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 15, 1996 (citing a study conducted by Teenage Research
Unlimited). See also Chuck Haga, Minnesota Megamall's Effort to Subdue Teen Rowdiness
Raises Issues of Fairness and Racial Bias, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 9, 1996.
8. See Meredith, supra note 7, at B9.
9. The Mall instituted a Youth Liaison Program in January 1995. See Public Relations
Dep't, Mall of America, Press Release (Sept. 4,1996) [hereinafter September Press Release].
In this program, security officers work with teens both inside and outside the Mall. See id.
The officers are casually dressed when they visit schools to discuss appropriate behavior at
the Mall. See id. They also volunteer at youth community organizations. See id. In April
1996, the Mall instituted the Mighty Moms Program. See id. It consists of twenty women
who work with security officers in handling conflicts between disruptive teenagers and Mall
security. See Neal Karlen, Tapping 'Mom Power' to Police a Huge Mall, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
19, 1996, at C2. The Mighty Moms are able to diffuse tense situations and are highly
effective at combating ugly confrontations between mall security and teens. See id. The Mall
has also hired ten Dedicated Dads to serve the same function. For a further discussion of
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a small eruption of gun violence in which teens were both the
perpetrators and the victims,"° Mall management initiated more
drastic measures. Thus, on October 4, 1996, the privately-owned
Mall" instituted a juvenile curfew termed a Parental Escort
Policy; the goal of this policy was to reduce the number of
unaccompanied teenagers at the Mall on weekend nights. 2 Under
the policy, guards are posted at the Mall's twenty-three entrances
and deny access after 6 p.m. on Friday and Saturday nights to
anyone who is under the age of sixteen and not in the company of
an adult twenty-one years of age or older. 3 The adult must
exercise control over the teens in his or her care. 4 Mall security
has the discretion to decide whether the group of teens is too large
to be controlled by its escort.' 5 The Mall's management states
that it instituted the curfew as a preventative measure in order to
these Mall programs, see infra text accompanying notes 176-78.
10. In June 1996, Nancy A. Bordeaux and her family were visiting the Mall when a
teenager pointed his gun at her sixteen year old son Felix. See Meredith, supra note 7, at
B9. The gun-toting youth mistakenly thought Felix was a member of a rival group that he
was chasing through the Mall. See id.
A widely reported incident occurred in 1993 in the Camp Snoopy Amusement Park.
One group of male teenagers approached another group and demanded that a thirteen year
old boy in the second group give them his jacket. See Bob Greene, What to Do When
Trouble Shows Up? Easy, Call Mom, CHI. TRIB., May 7, 1996. There was a gunfight and
three of the teenagers were shot. See id These are the two most widely news reported
incidences of gun violence.
11. The owners of the Mall are Triple Five Corp., Melvin Simon & Assoc., and the
Teacher's Insurance & Annuity Ass'n. See AT A GLANCE, supra note 1.
12. See September Press Release, supra note 9. "Mall of America will implement a
Parental Escort Policy effective October 4, 1996, to reduce the growing number of
unsupervised youth at the Mall on weekend nights." Id.
13. See id. Mall security will also conduct sweeps throughout the Mall between 6 p.m.
and closing to ask for identification from teenagers who entered the Mall prior to 6 p.m. See
id.
14. One adult may escort up to 10 children ages 15 and younger. See DESTINATION
PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 2.
When teenagers throughout the country were surveyed by various newspapers
regarding their thoughts on the Mall's juvenile curfew, the overwhelming majority felt that
the curfew was unfair and too restrictive. One Minnesota teen's response to the Parental
Escort Policy was succinct: "[I]t would stink. If you came here with your mom, you'd have
to go to Linens 'N Things. And you wouldn't have any independence." Sally Apgar, Escort
Policy for Youths Considered by Megamall, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR-TRIB., June 20,
1996. Added another teen, "[Tihis is where we go to get away from our parents." Id.
"Teen-age shoppers who were interviewed recently said they would not be caught dead
with their parents at the Mall of America, the biggest mall in the country and the coolest
spot in town." Meredith, supra note 7, at Al.
15. See September Press Release, supra note 9.
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avoid future teen violence. 16  Mall management was further
concerned for the safety of innocent bystanders, as it desires to
maintain a safe atmosphere for all who patronize the Mall. 7
The effect of the policy has been to drastically curtail
teenagers' right of assembly on Mall premises. Thus, the curfew
raises many constitutional issues that are not easily answered.18
This comment mainly addresses the issue of whether the privately
owned Mall of America is so accessible to the public as to be
deemed a public space for state action purposes. If so, the next
inquiry must be whether state and federal constitutional rights
should be granted at the Mall and, if so, to what extent. The issue
is an interesting one because both sides have strong constitutional
and emotional arguments and because a teen assembly right on
mall property is a relatively new concept.' 9 Between Mall man-
agement's right to control its property and the teenagers' right to
assemble at the Mall lies a delicate balance. This comment
16. Mall visitors and store owners have lodged complaints regarding the "gangs" of
teenagers who stand in large groups in certain areas of the Mall on weekend evenings.
However, according to Mall Spokeswoman Teresa McFarland, the main reason the curfew
was instituted was to combat violence and promote a safe atmosphere. See Telephone
Interview with Teresa McFarland, Spokeswoman for the Mall of America (Oct. 31, 1996)
[hereinafter McFarland Interview].
17. See id.
18. Other issues of significance which can only be tangentially covered by this comment
include: 1) whether the Mall has a right to exclude such a broad class of people; and 2)
whether by doing so the Mall is effectively discriminating against the disproportionately large
number of minority teens who go to the Mall on weekend evenings. See infra note 279. See
generally Apgar, supra note 14.
19. While the Mall of America's juvenile curfew received national news coverage, it was
based on two lesser-known pre-existing curfews. See id. One was the curfew at the
Asheville Mall in Asheville, North Carolina, enacted in 1993. See id. The Asheville curfew
affects teenagers younger than 16 who are at the mall from 6-9 p.m. on Saturday evenings.
See id. According to a spokeswoman for the mall, the curfew was imposed due to "an
alarming trend of violent, aggressive, disturbing, lewd behavior that was getting worse. And
we didn't want to get a reputation as a bad place to come on a Saturday night." Id. (quoting
Mary Evans). In February 1994, the Patrick Henry Mall in Newport News, Virginia, became
the second mall to impose such a curfew after teenagers were found with guns and clubs.
See id. The curfew proved highly effective with incidents reportedly dropping by 80%. The
types of incidents were not elaborated upon. See id. See also Lauren Beckham, Teen Rap
Shopping for a Hangout-Malls Consider Evening Curfews to Curtail Crime, BOSTON
HERALD, Oct. 14, 1996; The Associated Press, Weekend Curfew at Mall of America Protested
by Some, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 6, 1996.
The Newport News curfew was retracted after it achieved its purpose. See McFarland
Interview, supra note 16. The Asheville curfew, while similarly effective, has not been
retracted. See id. Ms. McFarland stated that she regards the Mall of America curfew as akin
to the Asheville curfew, therefore establishing the Parental Escort Policy as permanent Mail
policy. See id.
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analyzes one set of factors at work in that balance, and, while it
respects the Mall owners' rights, it leans in favor of a constitutional
right for teenagers to assemble at the Mall.
Thus, this comment challenges the constitutionality of the Mall
of America's Parental Escort Policy although no cause of action has
yet been filed against the Mall regarding the implementation of this
curfew. Indeed, the Minnesota chapter of the ACLU has stated
that it will not challenge the curfew because Minnesota constitu-
tional law is not favorable to its cause of action.2" However, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has not yet decided upon the application
of First Amendment 2  principles to privately-owned shopping
malls. Based upon an examination of Minnesota statutory and case
law, there is a strong argument to be made for the unconstitutional-
ity of this curfew under existing Minnesota law.22 This comment
argues that while the Mall of America has a recognized interest in
promoting safety on its premises, the breadth of its curfew
constitutes a taking of the teenagers' freedom of assembly rights.
Before the Mall implemented the Parental Escort Policy, a number
of other alternatives already existed that would have made the Mall
a safer environment without infringing on any one group's rights.
23
An in-depth analysis of Minnesota individual liberties protections
provides strong authority for supporting teenager assembly rights
at the Mall.
Beginning in 1968 with Amalgamated Food Employees Union
v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,24 the United States Supreme Court
20. See Meredith, supra note 7, at B9. Kathleen Milner, legal counsel for the Minnesota
Civil Liberties Union, stated that "Minnesota does not apply First Amendment principles to
shopping malls." Id.
However, other ACLU attorneys take a more activist approach to challenge the
curfew. Chris Hansen, a senior staff counsel at the Manhattan ACLU, stated that the curfew
"infringes on the rights of young people .... We don't object to the mail setting up rules
of behavior, but we do object ... to punishing the good kids for the behavior of kids that
aren't behaving." Meredith, supra note 7, at B9. Similarly, John Roberts, executive director
of the Massachusetts chapter of the ACLU, has stated that "[m]alls are private prop-
erty .... But in the instance of the Mall of America, I think it is a punishment of the
innocent based on the fact that some kids act up and act out. It just seems like one of these
overkill measures that sweeps way too broadly." Beckham, supra note 19.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The text of the amendment states that "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
22. See discussion infra Part IV.
23. See discussion infra Part V.
24. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
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has resolved four First Amendment challenges against finding any
federal constitutional right to free speech in the settings of
privately-owned shopping centers or malls.2 5 In addition to the
United States Supreme Court, numerous state courts have
considered the issue of First Amendment free speech rights with
regard to petitioning and leafleting at privately-owned shopping
centers. 26 However, the right of a shopping center to exclude a
certain class based solely on age is an issue of first impression.
Malls across the country are watching to see if the Mall of
America's curfew succeeds, and, if it does, they may institute their
own juvenile curfews. 27  Were the Mall's curfew successfully
challenged, the outcome could have an impact on malls throughout
the United States.
This comment presents one framework for analyzing the
constitutionality of a private shopping mall curfew while simulta-
neously applying this analysis to the Mall of America's curfew.
Depending on factors unique to each situation, the emphasis on the
issues will vary. Part II examines the application of First Amend-
ment free speech principles in private shopping centers in order to:
1) establish the backdrop for the proposed challenge; and 2) draw
a correlation between free speech rights and assembly rights on
private property. A line of United States Supreme Court cases that
have addressed the issue of First Amendment free speech rights in
private shopping centers will thus be analyzed in order to deter-
mine the Court's stance on the application of such protections in
private shopping malls. The most recent in this line of cases is
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins2 which held that state
constitutions may afford individuals First Amendment type-rights
in privately-owned shopping centers so long as the restrictions do
not constitute a taking or otherwise violate the Federal Constitu-
25. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424
U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Amalgamated Food Employees
Union, 391 U.S. at 308.
26. See discussion infra notes 84-86 (regarding state court decisions).
27. See, e.g., Karl Vick, Area Malls Watching Curfew and Wondering What's in Store for
Them, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1996, at A13; Lisa Peterson, Malls in Jersey in No Hurry to
Chase Teens-Minnesota Curfew Draws Their Interest, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, Oct.9, 1996;
Curfew Begins at Mall of America, WIS. STATE J., Oct. 5, 1996; Chet Fuller, Curfew Targets
Teenagers at Minnesota Mall, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 21, 1996; Meredith, supra note 7,
at Al.
28. 447 U.S. at 81.
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tion.29 PruneYard held that First Amendment rights in private
shopping centers may be enlarged under state constitutions.3 ° It
did not limit those rights to the freedom of speech.3' Because
PruneYard applied to all First Amendment individual liberties, it
must, therefore, include the right of assembly.
Post-PruneYard state court decisions concerning free speech
rights at shopping malls turn on the outcome of four questions: 1)
Is the nature of the mall such that in essence it is a public space?;
2) What does the respective state constitution provide in the
manner of First Amendment type-rights?; 3) How have those state
provisions been interpreted?; and 4) How should they be inter-
preted in the immediate context?3 2 Thus, Part III answers the
first question by taking a detailed look at the Mall of America
itself. After an examination of the Mall's establishments and its
self-promotion, it will be argued that the privately-owned Mall
serves as the new Bloomington downtown and is in all respects
except for ownership a public space. Analogous decisions in state
courts have created free speech rights at shopping centers based on
findings that many larger malls have come to resemble, or in fact
usurp, the role of the traditional downtown area.33 Based upon
this determination, courts have declared these private centers or
malls to be so essentially public in nature as to require the
protection of certain individual liberties on their premises.
Therefore, courts have held that private mall owners' rights to
prohibit certain speech must fall to the invitees' First Amendment
rights, although reasonable restrictions on the place and timing of
the speech are permitted.34
Part IV examines the Minnesota Constitution and its interpret-
ation by the Minnesota Supreme Court with regard to its protection
of individual liberties. While the Minnesota Supreme Court has
never decided an individual liberty challenge in the context of a
shopping mall, it has consistently read the state constitution broadly
to provide for the protection of individual liberties not enumerated
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. "[N]either appellants' federally recognized property rights nor their First
Amendment rights have been infringed by the California Supreme Court's decision
recognizing a right of appellees to exercise state-protected rights of expression .... " Id. at
88.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 84-86.
33. See discussion infra notes 148-61.
34. See id. See also discussion infra notes 84, 86.
19981
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therein.35 Minnesota's Human Rights Act36 is another source to
be examined in its application to this cause of action.
Part V argues that the curfew's breadth removes it from the
sphere of a reasonable regulation on private property, and other
methods to address the Mall's safety concerns are proposed.
Finally, Part VI presents affirmative defenses that would likely
be raised by the Mall of America in support of its Parental Escort
Policy. These include the Mall's strong interest in promoting a safe
environment and that dismantling the Parental Escort Policy would
result in a taking of private property. The safety factor is a very
strong argument in favor of the curfew. The Mall is responsible for
the safety of all of its patrons, shopkeepers, and personnel.
Nevertheless, the Mall can protect these persons by employing
other protective devices (as discussed in Part V) rather than an
across-the-board juvenile curfew. By implementing the juvenile
curfew, the Mall crossed the line between a welfare and safety
measure and a denial of access rights to a group it has made every
effort into bring to its premises.
II. First Amendment Rights in Privately Owned Shopping
Centers
In a number of cases concerning the right to distribute litera-
ture, petition, or solicit signatures on private property, the United
States Supreme Court has firmly held that there is no federal
constitutional protection of First Amendment37 free speech rights
on such property.38 However, the route the Court has taken to
arrive at the current standing has not been without its detours. A
brief history of the five major cases 39 that have shaped this area
of the law provides the background for an analysis of how the Mall
of America's curfew fits into this historical continuum.
The line of cases starts with Marsh v. Alabama,' which was
the first case to recognize free speech rights on private property.41
35. See discussion infra notes 202-60.
36. MINN. STAT. ANN., §§ 363.01-.20 (West 1991 & West Supp. 1998).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
38. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
39. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr, v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424
U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Amalgamated Food Employees
Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946).
40. 326 U.S. at 501.
41. See id. at 512 (Reed, J., dissenting).
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The private property in Marsh was Chickasaw, Alabama, a
company town owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation having
"all the characteristics of any other American town., 42  The
homes, shops, streets, and even sewer systems were company
owned.43 Grace Marsh was convicted of criminal trespass" after
she attempted to distribute religious literature on a downtown
Chickasaw sidewalk.45 When she appealed her criminal trespass
conviction, the Court was asked to decide if her free speech rights
took precedence over Gulf's property rights, and the Court held
that they did.'
The Court's analysis was two-fold. First, the Court conducted
a detailed fact-finding of the nature of the town.47 Placing
substance over form, the Court's aim was to discern whether the
town was essentially private or public property, regardless of
ownership.' Relying on the fact that the town's business district
was accessible to any individual wishing to enter, the Court held
Chickasaw to be essentially no different from any non-company-
owned town.49 The Court then balanced the private property
interests of the Gulf Corporation with the First Amendment rights
of those who entered Chickasaw. The Court found that the more
the town invited, welcomed, and served as any other town, the
more it lost its ability to prohibit constitutionally protected
behavior.5° Justice Black, writing for the majority, stated that
42. Id. at 502.
43. See id. at 502-03.
44. Ms. Marsh was arrested in violation of title 14, section 426 of the 1940 Alabama
Code after she was warned that she could not distribute literature without a permit. See id.
at 503-04. Furthermore, she was informed that she would be unable to obtain a permit. See
id. at 503. When Ms. Marsh refused to leave the sidewalk, she was arrested under this code
provision which "makes it a crime to enter or remain on the premises of another after having
been warned not to do so." Id. at 504.
45. See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 503.
46. See id. at 508-09.
47. See id. at 502-03.
48. See id. at 504-09.
49. See id. at 503. The Court stated: "In short the town and its shopping district are
accessible to and freely used by the public in general and there is nothing to distinguish them
from any other town and shopping center except the fact that the title to the property
belongs to a private corporation." Id.
50. See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 506. Similarly, the Mall of America is open to all who wish
to enter. See generally PUBLIC RELATIONS DEP'T, MALL OF AMERICA, THE PLACE FOR
FUN IN YOUR LIFE (1996) [hereinafter THE PLACE FOR FUN]. Shopping hours are from 10
a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 11 a.m. to 7 p.m. on Sunday. See id.
Entertainment and summer hours are extended. See id. The Mall is closed two days of the
year: Thanksgiving and Christmas Day. See id.
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"[o]wnership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more
an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the
public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by
the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.""
When balancing a property owner's rights against those of the
freedoms of press and religion, the latter occupies a "preferred
position., 52  Thus, the First Amendment, as applied through the
Fourteenth, was held to apply to Chickasaw and to permit Ms.
Marsh to distribute religious literature in downtown Chickasaw.
Twenty-two years later, the Court again considered the issue
of free speech rights on private property in Amalgamated Food
Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.53 Here, for the first
time, the Court was deciding a freedom of speech issue within the
context of a shopping center. Logan Valley Mall prohibited as
trespass picketing on its premises. 54  When this prohibition was
challenged, the Court held that the Logan Valley Mall was as open
and accessible to the general public as the Marsh Chickasaw
business district.55  Authoring the majority opinion, Justice
Marshall wrote that
[w]e see no reason why access to a business district in a
company town for the purpose of exercising First Amendment
rights should be constitutionally required, while access for the
same purpose to property functioning as a business district
51. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 506.
52. Id. at 509. The Court stated: "As we have stated before, the right to exercise the
liberties safeguarded by the First Amendment 'lies at the foundation of free government by
free men' and we must in all cases 'weigh the circumstances and ... appraise the...
reasons ... in support of the regulation ... of [those] rights."' Id. (quoting Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939)).
53. 391 U.S. 308, 309 (1968).
54. See id. at 311. Weis Markets and Sears Roebuck and Co. were the two companies
occupying Logan Valley Plaza. See id. at 310. A sign was posted by Weis on the outside of
its store prohibiting "trespass or soliciting by anyone other than its employees on its porch
or parking lot." Id. at 311.
55. See id. at 315. The court noted that
[i]t is clear that if the shopping center premises were not privately owned
but instead constituted the business area of a municipality, which they to a
large extent resemble, petitioners could not be barred from exercising their
First Amendment rights there on the sole ground that title to the property
was in the municipality.
[Vol. 102:2
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should be limited simply because the property surrounding the
'business district' is not under the same ownership. 6
Building upon Marsh, the Court held that Logan Valley Mall could
not exclude those members of the public wishing to exercise their
First Amendment rights as long as those rights are exercised in a
manner consonant with the property's purpose. 7 The Court did
affirm the private property owner's right to regulate First Amend-
ment rights so long as any restrictions were reasonable in nature.5 8
The Court limited the Logan Valley holding four years later in
Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner.59 Here, for the first time, the Court
was strictly dealing with a mall situation as opposed to the
company town in Marsh or the shopping center in Logan Valley.
The mall at Lloyd Center was a privately owned, multi-level
building containing stores and parking facilities and surrounded by
public sidewalks and streets.6 ° However, the Court did not find
that the Center lost its private character due to its size,6" holding
that the public invitation to come to the Center must be compatible
56. Id. at 319. Extending this argument to the Mall of America situation is the focus
of Part III of this comment. It is the intention of this comment to prove that the Mall of
America functions in much the same way as a downtown business district. Thus, as the
Majority exalts substance over form in Logan Valley, so should the Mall's essentially public
character be of greater importance than its private ownership.
57. See id. at 319-20. The Logan Valley picketers were stationed outside the Weis
supermarket and sought to inform customers that the supermarket's employees were non-
union. See id. at 311. They were located in the parcel pickup area and the adjacent parking
lot and posed no interference with customers entering or leaving the store. See id.
In Logan Valley, the Court refused to answer the question whether picketing would
be allowed if it was not directly related to the property's purpose. See id. at 320, n.9.
58. See Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 320. Therein, the Court recognized the emergence
of the shopping center in relation to changing demographic trends: "The large-scale
movement of this country's population from the cities to the suburbs has been accompanied
by the advent of the suburban shopping center, typically a cluster of individual retail units
on a single large privately owned tract." Id. at 324. Perhaps nothing reflects this shift better
than the creation and popularity of the Mall of America.
59. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
60. See id. at 554-56. Indeed, the Court placed emphasis on the nature of the mall and
its societal role through the Court's in-depth discussion of the mall's attributes. See id. at
554. It must also be remembered that the year was 1972, when malls were still relatively new
in the United States. The Mall of America was built 20 years later, and the public's attitude
towards malls has evolved and changed with the growth of the shopping giant.
61. See id. at 369. The Court declared:
Nor does property lose its private character merely because the public is generally
invited to use it for designated purposes .... The essentially private character of
a store and its privately owned abutting property does not change by virtue of
being large or clustered with other stores in a modern shopping center.
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with the purposes of the stores therein.62 Because defendant
Tanner went to the mall to distribute handbill invitations to a
meeting protesting the Vietnam War, his speech was unprotected
because it did not have a direct relationship to the center's
purposes. Therefore, over a lengthy dissent authored by Justice
Marshall,63 it appeared that Lloyd left Logan Valley applicable
only to situations in which the speech involved purposes consonant
with the purposes of the mall itself.
Four years after Lloyd, the Supreme Court completed its
evisceration of Logan Valley in Hudgens v. NLRB. 64 Hudgens
held that Logan Valley did not survive Lloyd in any form and was,
therefore, overruled by Lloyd.65  The issue in Hudgens was
whether striking union members had a right to picket in front of
one of their employer's retail stores located in a shopping mall.'
Relying on Lloyd for the proposition that privately owned shopping
malls retain their private natures, the Hudgens Court held that First
Amendment free speech principles were not applicable in a
privately owned shopping mall.67 The Court stated:
[I]f the respondents in the Lloyd case did not have a First
Amendment right to enter that shopping center to distribute
handbills concerning Vietnam, then the pickets in the present
case did not have a First Amendment right to enter this
shopping center for the purpose of advertising their strike
against the Butler Shoe Co.'
62. Unlike the picketers in Logan Valley, the handbillers in Lloyd had alternative areas
available where they could relay their message. The Court noted that Lloyd Center was
surrounded by public sidewalks that many Center patrons had to cross on their way to the
Center. See id. at 556. Therefore, "[i]t would be an unwarranted infringement of property
rights to require [the center's owners] to yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights
under circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of communication exist." Id. at 567.
Picketing, demonstrating, dist'ributing handbills, soliciting, and petitioning at the Mall
of America are permissible with the prior written consent of the Mall's management. See
Mall of America, Conduct Code (1996).
63. The Lloyd decision was 5,4. Justice Marshall, author of the Logan Valley majority
opinion, wrote the Lloyd dissent in which Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Stewart joined.
64. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
65. See id. at 518. The court declared that "[w]e make clear now, if it was not clear
before, that the rationale of Logan Valley did not survive the Court's decision in the Lloyd
case." Id.
66. See id. at 509.
67. See id. at 520-21.
68. Id.
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The Court so held even though there was a connection between the
picketing and one of the stores in the mall, a linkage that was
absent in Lloyd.69
Most recently, the United States Supreme Court further
clarified its Lloyd holding in PruneYard Shopping Center v.
Robins.70 PruneYard was a large shopping mall in California71
whose owner sought to prohibit high school students from gather-
ing signatures protesting a United Nations resolution on mall
property.72 The California Supreme Court upheld the students'
right to petition in the mall under the California Constitution.73
Relying on a line of California cases 74 and interpreting Lloyd not
to prohibit the California Constitution from providing greater
protections than the First Amendment, the California Supreme
69. Justice Marshall noted in his dissent that Lloyd preserved the right to picket when
the picketing is related to the purpose of the property and when other alternatives for
communicating the desired message are unavailable. See Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 540.
70. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
71. Again, the United States Supreme Court placed emphasis on the fact-finding of the
lower court in determining the nature of the mall. The Court reiterated the finding of the
California Supreme Court that approximately 25,000 people congregated daily at the mall
as a result of advertising and "the lure of a congenial environment." Id. at 78.
72. See id. at 77. Appellees were a number of high school students who set up a card
table in the mall's central courtyard and who attempted to solicit support for their opposition
to a resolution against "Zionism." See id.
73. See Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal. 1979).
74. In so doing, the California Supreme Court cleared up any confusion regarding its
own stance on free speech rights on public property. In Diamond v. Bland, 477 P.2d 733
(Cal. 1970), the court permitted free speech rights in a privately owned shopping center.
After the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Lloyd, the court reversed Diamond I in Diamond
I. See Diamond v. Bland, 521 P.2d 460 (Cal. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
Justice Mosk wrote a lengthy dissent in Diamond H in which he compared the shopping
center in question to a downtown area in which citizens are granted free speech protections.
See id. at 468. In Robins v. PruneYard, the court was presented with two questions: 1)
whether Lloyd provided federally protected private property rights such that state
constitutions were preempted from providing greater free speech rights on private property;
and 2) if not, whether the California Constitution affirmatively protects free speech rights
at shopping centers. See Robins, 592 P.2d at 342. Answering the first question, the court
held that Lloyd was a First Amendment issue and that references to the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments only applied to the state action question. See id. at 344. The court
read nothing in Lloyd to preempt states from construing their own constitutions more
broadly than the Federal Constitution. See id. at 346. Answering the second question, the
court held that the California Constitution provided greater free speech protections than the
First Amendment and that these protections extend to a private space whose purposes and
uses cause it to function as a public arena. See id. at 347. The court was influenced by
Justice Mosk's Diamond H dissent holding that the shopping center in question, while
privately owned, was so public in nature that it constituted a public space worthy of free
speech protections. See id. at 347.
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Court granted the students the right to solicit signatures and
distribute handbills under the California Constitution.75 This
ruling was highly significant because it granted certain free speech
rights in privately owned shopping malls, a right the federal
government was unwilling to provide.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed this holding. The
Court stated that while the Federal Constitution does not protect
free speech rights in shopping centers and malls,76 it does provide
a floor of individual liberties protections that state constitutions can
build upon but never go below." Indeed, the Supreme Court held
that Lloyd did not limit states from construing their own constitu-
tions more expansively than the Federal Constitution with regard
to individual liberties.7" Article 1, section 2 of the California
Constitution states that "[e]very person may freely speak, write and
publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for
the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty
of speech or press., 79  The Supreme Court of California inter-
preted this provision to allow a right of "speech and petitioning,
reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the centers are
privately owned." 8  Responding to the mall owner's argument
that allowing the students to petition on his property amounts to a
Fifth Amendment taking of private property without compensation,
the United States Supreme Court held that the right to exclude
others was not essential to the use of the property. The Court
stated: "There is nothing to suggest that preventing appellants from
prohibiting this sort of activity will unreasonably impair the value
or use of their property as a shopping center."8'
75. See Robins, 592 P.2d at 347.
76. See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 81.
77. See id. The purpose of this analysis is to lay the groundwork for arguing for the
right to freedom of assembly at the Mall of America under the Minnesota Constitution. This
comment argues that PruneYard was intended to extend to all First Amendment type rights
including the right to assemble. For older Supreme Court precedent holding that state
constitutions may provide a source of greater individual liberty rights than their federal
counterpart, see Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) and Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58
(1967).
78. See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 81. The Court stated: "Our reasoning in Lloyd,
however, does not ex proprio vigore limit the authority of the State to exercise its police
power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more
expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution." Id.
79. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
80. Robins, 592 P.2d at 347.
81. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 83.
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Since no specific harm could be proven by permitting the
students access to solicit signatures and distribute information, the
Court determined that free speech rights under the California
Constitution outweigh private property rights under the Fifth
Amendment.82 Thus, under PruneYard, the current status of the
law is that states may use their own constitutions to build upon
First Amendment protections on private property, but state
constitutions can never provide fewer rights than those already
granted under the Federal Constitution.83
PruneYard subsequently bred much state litigation regarding
whether state constitutions provided broader free speech rights
than those granted under the Federal Constitution in the privately
owned property context. In the early 1980s, a number of courts
found in favor of free speech rights.' The tide began to change
in the mid-eighties,85 and in the nineties the courts have been
82. See id. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the mall's right to impose
reasonable regulations to insure that the exercise of free speech rights did not interfere with
the mall's regular business operations. See id. Similarly, the Mall of America does have a
Conduct Code in place for this same purpose.
83. See id.
84. See Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 A.2d 1382 (Pa. 1981) (holding that when balancing
free speech and private property rights, a college could not totally prohibit leafleting on
campus); Alderwood Assoc. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 635 P.2d 108 (Wash. 1981)
(permitting the collection of signatures at a mall as the mall was functioning as the new
downtown). See also Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, Inc. 445 N.E.2d 590 (Mass. 1983)
(holding that a candidate for political office had a right to petition at a shopping center based
on state election laws); State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980) (discussed in Part 111);
State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971) (discussed in Part III). For a detailed analysis of
state court decisions before 1986, see John A. Ragosta, Free Speech Access to Shopping Malls
Under State Constitutions: Analysis and Rejection, 37 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (1986).
85. See Fiesta Mall Venture v. Mecham Recall Comm., 767 P.2d 719 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1988) (declaring that the Fiesta Mall did not constitute the downtown area rather than
considering whether the mall met the state action requirement that would allow for signature
solicitations); Cologne v. Westfarms Assoc. 469 A.2d 1201 (Conn. 1984) (holding that nothing
in the Connecticut Constitution supported free speech rights in a privately owned mall to
allow for the solicitation of signatures in support of the proposed ERA Amendment);
Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 378 N.W.2d 337 (Mich. 1985) (declaring that the
Michigan Constitution did not prevent private mall owners from restricting First Amendment
rights with regards to the solicitation of signatures at shopping malls); Shad Alliance v. Smith
Haven Mall, 488 N.E.2d 1211 (NY. 1985) (upholding a privately-owned shopping mall's
prohibition against leafleting based on a finding of no state action at the mall); Western Pa.
Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 1331, 1337 (Pa.
1986); Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 A.2d 1382 (Pa. 1981) (holding that the mall was not a
downtown district and that political speech at a private mall was not protected speech under
the Pennsylvania Constitution); Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic Policy
Comm., 780 P.2d 1282 (Wash. 1989) (holding a state action requirement implicit in the state
constitution and that the solicitation of political contributions at a privately owned mall was
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almost evenly split.86 In December 1994, the New Jersey Supreme
Court issued a detailed decision on this subject.87 Due to the
similarity of the facts of the New Jersey case to the issues surround-
ing the Mall of America, that case provides the most persuasive
authority to be used as a point of comparison with Minnesota
caselaw. However, before embarking on an application of
PruneYard to Minnesota Constitutional law and the Mall of
America, it is necessary to analyze the features of the Mall itself.
The point of departure for an analysis of freedom of assembly
rights at the Mall of America lies in the nature of the Mall. Since
state constitutions apply to state action,88 it must be argued and
established that the Mall functions not as private property but as
a public space. Courts that have found free speech rights at malls
have done so based first upon the nature of the mall as a "down-
town" area, and based secondly, in conjunction with state First
thus prohibited as the state constitution established rights between the people and their
government rather than between people and people, and thus reversing Alderwood's holding
that Washington's free speech provision protected speech on private property); Jacobs v.
Major, 407 N.W.2d 832 (Wis. 1987) (holding that the Wisconsin Constitution's free speech
protections did not extend to private property in an action brought by an antinuclear dance
troupe which wanted to perform at a private shopping mall). See also State v. Felmet, 273
S.E.2d 708 (N.C. 1981) (upholding the prohibition of petitioning in the parking lot of a
privately owned shopping mall).
86. For cases granting free speech rights in privately owned shopping malls, see Westside
Sane/Freeze v. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., 274 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1990) (following PruneYard and
permitting leafleting at a privately owned mall); Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55
(Colo. 1991) (allowing political leafleting at a mall due to the state's financial interest in the
mall which constituted state action and triggered free speech protections under the Colorado
Constitution, but stating that under PruneYard it was unnecessary to find state action when
a state constitution is more protective of free speech than the Federal Constitution, as the
majority believed to be the case with the Colorado Constitution and declaring the mall the
new downtown and public forum); New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v.
J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757 (N.J. 1994) (discussed at length in Part III).
Those cases supporting private property owner's rights to prohibit free speech include
Citizens for Ethical Gov't, Inc. v. Gwinnet Place Assoc., 392 S.E.2d 8 (Ga. 1990) (holding that
the Georgia Constitution did not protect petitioning on private property); Eastwood Mall,
Inc. v. Slanco, 626 N.E.2d 59 (Ohio 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 933 (1994) (holding that the
Ohio Constitution's free speech guarantees were no broader than the First Amendment) and
Charleston Joint Venture v. McPherson, 417 S.E.2d 544 (S.C. 1992) (holding that the South
Carolina Constitution's free speech provisions provided no more free speech protections than
the Federal Constitution).
87. See New Jersey Coalition, 650 A.2d at 757.
88. For a fuller explication of the state action requirement, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18-1, at 1688-1720 (2d ed. 1988).
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Amendment-type provisions." Following is a detailed analysis of
the Mall of America as public arena.
III. Is the Mall of America the New "Downtown"?
The Mall of America is the largest retail and entertainment
complex in the United States.' From its opening in 1992, there
have been over 190 million visits to the Mall with weekly visits
ranging from 600,000 to 900,000 depending on the season.91 The
Mall is located only five minutes from the Minneapolis/Saint Paul
International Airport,' a convenient location because over thirty
percent of the Mall's visits are made by people from outside a 150
mile radius.93 Even foreigners make the Mall of America a stop
on their itineraries, if not a focal point, as evidenced by the fact
that international visitors account for six percent of the Mall's pa-
trons.94 Indeed, the Mall has become such a tourist attraction in
the six years since its opening that citizens of each of the fifty states
and over two dozen nations have visited it.95 As amazing as it
may seem, the Mall attracts more visits annually than Disney World
89. Beginning with Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) the United States Supreme
Court spent a good deal of time analyzing the nature of the place where the free speech
rights were being asserted. See id. at 502-03. A detailed fact-finding of the situation was
important to determine the nature of the space itself, be it a company owned town (Marsh),
shopping center (Logan Valley), or mall (Lloyd Corp., Hudgens and PruneYard). State
courts, therefore, place much emphasis on the nature of the shopping center or mall in ques-
tion when deciding whether to find for free speech rights at these locations.
90. See AT A GLANCE, supra note 1.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See TOURISM, supra note 3. In 1994 alone, more than 22,000 people in the United
States participated in a same-day, low-cost airfare package on Northwest Airlines that
brought them to the Mall for one shopping day. See id. A continuous bus service leaves
every half hour from the airport going to the Mall. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id. As Mall literature proudly states, people from the following countries have
been to the Mall: Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, China, England, France, Finland,
Germany, Guam, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Mexico,
the Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan and Thailand. See
id. Over 30,000 organized tour groups and over 800 Japanese groups have visited the Mall.
See id. In order to accommodate many of these guests, the Mall of America Grand Hotel
is located on the lremises. See THE PLACE FOR FUN, supra note 50. A second hotel, the
Doubletree Grand Hotel at Mall of America, is located across the street from the Mall and
advertises itself as the "official hotel across from the Mall." MAP AND DIRECTORY, supra
note 4.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:2
and the Grand Canyon combined.96 Clearly, the Mall has estab-
lished itself in the American iconographic landscape.97
The Mall complex itself is awesome both in its grandness and
by the attention to detail which went into its design. The Mall
encompasses 4.2 million square feet98 with a gross leaseable retail
space of 2.5 million square feet.99 The rest of the space is allotted
for entertainment.'00 The Mall is so vast that a walk around one
of its four level covers a distance of .57 miles.' The Mall has
four national chain anchor stores: Bloomingdales, Macy's, Nord-
strom's, and Sears; and five-hundred twenty smaller stores located
amongst the anchors.1 2 The Mall is in the shape of a square, and
there are four "streets"'0 3 connecting the anchors stores in which
the smaller stores are located. Each of the four "streets" has a
distinct and separate character." 4 The Mall of America's promo-
96. See September Press Release, supra note 9. Justice Black's Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501 (1946), majority opinion is thus recalled that "[t]he more an owner, for his
advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights
become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it." Id. at
506. While the context in which these words were written pertained to a company-owned
town, they are not limited to company-owned towns only. They do in fact have significant
bearing on the Mall of America. The owners of the Mall have made their property as
accessible to the public as possible, and the Mall should fall within the Marsh penumbra of
public places, regardless of private ownership.
97. After a visit to the Mall of America, the columnist Molly Ivins wrote, "[gireat
Caesar's armpit! Sweet suffering catfish! Holy gamoly! I have been to the pyramids of
America. I have seen the cathedral of commerce. Our Parthenon, our Coliseum, our
Chartres. I have been to the Mall of America, the world's largest shopping mall." PUBLIC
RELATIONS DEP'T, MALL OF AMERICA, QUOTABLES (1996) [hereinafter QUOTABLES].
98. In order to grasp how large the Mall of America actually is, consider the following
facts: the Mall can hold 32 Boeing 747s; it is as large as seven Yankee Stadiums; Moscow's
Red Square can fit into the Mall five times, as can 20 of St. Peter's Basilicas in Rome. See
PUBLIC RELATIONS DEP'T, MALL OF AMERICA, FUN FACTS & QUOTABLES (1996)
[hereinafter FUN FACTS & QUOTABLES].
99. See AT A GLANCE, supra note 1. Gross leasable area is the total floor space
available for merchants. See id. Occupancy as of March 1995 was at 93.5%. See id.
100. See John Sprenkle & Michael Tubridy, Mall Openings Continue at Moderate Pace,
INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF SHOPPING CENTERS RES. Q., Summer 1996, at 13.
101. See FUN FACTS & QUOTABLES, supra note 98.
102. See THE PLACE FOR FUN, supra note 50. The Mall literature states, "[t]here are
stores to fit every budget from discount to moderate to upscale ...." Id. These include
specialty stores and national retail chain stores such as Filene's Basement, B. Dalton Books,
Banana Republic, Ann Taylor, and Eddie Bauer Home Collection. See id.
103. See PUBLIC RELATIONS DEP'T, MALL OF AMERICA, USER FRIENDLY (1996)
[hereinafter USER FRIENDLY].
104. See id. East Broadway, which connects Bloomingdale's and Sears, is modeled with
chrome to provide a futuristic look. South Avenue, the "street" between Macy's and
Bloomingdale's, is described as a "chic, sophisticated shopping avenue" while the West
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tional information states: "It is ... one of the most user friendly
architectural designs in the country."'' °5
In addition to the shopping, the Mall attracts adults to its
entertainment and nightlife. The Mall contains nine nightclubs, a
fourteen-screen movie theater, an eighteen-hole miniature golf
course, a sports bar, a comedy club, and a wide variety of restau-
rants.116 In order to accommodate adults who visit the Mall with
small children, the Mall offers four family rooms designed for
infant care.10 7 Not only do these rooms provide space to feed
and change babies, but they also contain microwaves for heating
bottles and vending machines that sell baby needs.0 8
Parents can enroll their teenagers in the Metropolitan Learning
Alliance, which is a high school located in the Mall.10 9 Adults can
earn a college degree from the National College,'the first college
campus located in a shopping mall.110 Courses include account-
ing, marketing, human resources, computer, and business."' The
College offers its classes during the day, at night, and on Satur-
days.'12 Other conveniences for families and adults include a
bank, a post office, a health and dental clinic, seven ATM machines
sites, a copy center, a hotel/car rental information phone, four Mall
of America Guest Service Centers, and two travel offices.113 The
Mall of America's promotional materials include one fact sheet
entitled "User Friendly" which details all of the conveniences
located in the Mall. In addition to the amenities already listed, the
Mall contains forty-four escalators and seventeen elevators and is
Market is modeled on a European railway station. See id. Lastly, the North Garden is
designed in the manner of a park containing gazebos and trellises. See id.
105. Id.
106. See PUBLIC RELATIONS DEP'T, MALL OF AMERICA, RESTAURANTS & NIGHTCLUBS
(1996) [hereinafter RESTAURANTS & NIGHTCLUBS]; PUBLIC RELATIONS DEP'T, MALL OF
AMERICA, THE PLACE FOR FUN IN YOUR LIFE (1997). The range of restaurants consists
of everything from the trendy Planet Hollywood and a Rainforest Cafd to the more upscale
Napa Valley Grille and California Caf6. See RESTAURANTS & NIGHTCLUBS, supra.
107. See PUBLIC RELATIONS DEP'T, MALL OF AMERICA; FAMILY FUN (1996)
[hereinafter FAMILY FUN].
108. See id.
109. See USER FRIENDLY, supra note 103.
110. See PUBLIC RELATIONS DEP'T, MALL OF AMERICA, CELEBRATING 5 YEARS OF
BRINGING THE WORLD TO MINNESOTA! (1997) [hereinafter CELEBRATING 5 YEARS].
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id. Not to be forgotten is the Chapel of Love. Over 1000 couples have been
married at the Mall of America since 1994. See PUBLIC RELATIONS DEP'T, MALL OF
AMERICA, FUN FACTS & QUOTABLES (1997); CELEBRATING 5 YEARS, supra note 110.
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handicapped accessible. The Mall provides over 20,000 free
parking spaces, and no vehicle parked on any one of the parking
ramps is farther than three hundred feet from one of the Mall's
twenty-three entrances.
114
While there are numerous stores and attractions for adults
and families, the Mall has made a concerted effort to attract youth.
There are a variety of attractions and stores in the Mall which are
intended to bring young people to the Mall complex. In the center
of the Mall is Knott's Camp Snoopy, a seven-acre family theme
park, which is the largest indoor theme park in the United
States.115 Knott's Camp Snoopy contains seventeen rides, nine
eating places, shopping, and various other forms of entertain-
ment.11 6 That the park is oriented toward older youth as well as
young children is evidenced by the rides inside the park: a log
chute, a roller coaster, and a "multisensory Mystery Mine
Ride.""1 7 Mall literature distinguishes these rides from those
intended for youngsters; such rides include the Li'l Shaver roller
coaster, Americana Carousal, and the Balloon Race.1 18 Restau-
rants in the park such as the Hormel Food Court and Kemp's
Cookies and Cream are oriented toward all age groups while the
fast food eateries in the east wing are heavily frequented by
teenagers.119 Other youth attractions at the Mall include Star-
Base Omega, an interactive laser game in which players are trained
and outfitted in special gear, and Tempus Expeditions, a shopping
center that provides an adventure-ifiled learning experience. The
Mall also contains such teenage-oriented stores as a super sports
store, a Tekno Comix interactive entertainment store, a holograms
store, and a "junkyard" selling "grunge" clothing1"
114. See DESTINATION PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 2.
115. See id. See also FAMILY FUN, supra note 107.
116. See id. Also of interest is the 1.2 million gallon walk-through aquarium and the
LEGO Imagination Center. See AT A GLANCE, supra note 1. Described as "an enormous
LEGO showplace designed as a three-level fantasy LEGO factory," it is a place in which
"[v]isitors are welcome at any time to come in and play with LEGO bricks and Duplo blocks
at no cost." FAMILY FUN, supra note 107.
117. See PUBLIC RELATIONS DEP'T, MALL OF AMERICA, KNOTT'S CAMP SNOOPY (1996)
[hereinafter KNOTr'S CAMP SNOOPY].
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See PUBLIC RELATIONS DEP'T, MALL OF AMERICA, UNIQUE & INNOVATIVE
RETAILERS (1996) [hereinafter UNIQUE & INNOVATIVE RETAILERS].
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The Mall's concerted effort to welcome and invite teenagers to
its premises is relevant to the teenagers' use of the Mall. Referring
to the mall managements in New Jersey Coalition, the New Jersey
Supreme Court stated that "[t]he issue is whether defendants'
actual conduct, the multitude of uses they permitted and encour-
aged, including expressive uses, amounted to an implied invitation
and, if so, the nature and extent of that invitation., 121 Little if
any doubt exists that the Mall of America openly welcomed all
teenagers to its premises and that the extent of this invitation, by
its very nature, included activities other than those enumerated
herein.
These are the highlights of some of the most popular
attractions at the Mall of America. What can hopefully be learned
from this information is that the Mall of America is a massive, all-
encompassing structure. As previously stated,122 almost all of the
preceding information comes from the Mall of America's promo-
tional literature. The Mall advertises itself as any other profit-
making endeavor would: by accentuating the positives.123 Hence,
the promotional materials include a detailed separate listing of all
conveniences offered at the Mall, a listing of all family activities,
and a listing of the restaurants and nightclubs on the premises. The
Mall aims to please everybody and advertises as such. 124  Once
the Mall has so invited and catered to the public, the question
presents itself whether it then is deemed a public space for First
Amendment purposes.
An appropriate place to begin this inquiry is the Mall's
literature itself. In one of its brochures entitled "The Place for Fun
in Your Life," the Mall management states that the Mall was
121. New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650
A.2d 757, 772 (N.J. 1994).
122. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
123. The Mall uses numerous superlatives in its promotional material, i.e. "the nation's
largest retail and entertainment center," USER FRIENDLY, supra note 103; "Knott's Camp
Snoopy, Mall of America's lively centerpiece, is the largest indoor family theme park in the
nation .. " KNOTT'S CAMP SNOOPY, supra note 117. "[W]hat sets Mall of America apart
from typical shopping malls is its unique range of retail, offering quality, variety and value,
from luxury to the basics .. " UNIQUE & INNOVATIVE RETAILERS, supra note 120. "Mall
of America is host to some of the finest eating establishments-all under one roof ... 
RESTAURANTS & NIGHTCLUBS, supra note 106.
124. Indeed, a poll taken from November 27 to December 3, 1995, revealed that 70% of
Mall shoppers combine a trip to the Mall with a visit to Knott's Camp Snoopy or the Mall's
nightclubs and bars. Sally Apgar, Minnesota Poll, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR-TRIB., Dec.
10, 1995.
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"[d]esigned as a city within a city.' ' 12 5 By naming the four wings
of the Mall "streets", the Mall refers to itself in terms of a
downtown area. "While the Mall's extensive skylight system allows
the visitors to feel as though they're outdoors, it's guaranteed
perfect weather and 70 degrees!, 126 Proof that Mall management
wants the Mall to be considered a self-contained city is evidenced
by the following quote from the Mall's promotional packet:
Yet the most striking thing about the mall is that [it] seems to
be providing what American cities themselves-at least the
downtown shopping districts of American cities-once provided:
a bright, vibrant, secure-feeling atmosphere where crowds of
people congregate day and night, an immaculate and thriving
shopping area where thousands of people-more than 600,000
during an average week-can spend time browsing, dining or
going to the theater, a clean and well-run place that, while one
is inside it, seems to be the center of things.
127
Not only does Mall management consider the Mall to be an
indoor city, but the contents of the Mall are the type found in a
city. In the Mall, one may: enroll one's teenager in school; get a
college degree; go to the health or dental clinic; make a bank
transaction; go to the post office; dine at any number of restau-
rants; go to the movies or a nightclub; and shop to satisfy basically
every need. Evidence that the Mall is a rival "downtown" is
exemplified by the fact that the year it opened, business in
downtown Minneapolis was "off" approximately twenty percent; by
August 1995, it had stabilized at eight to ten percent.
128
Perhaps the most decisive evidence that the Mall of America
functions as the new downtown comes from the people who live
125. THE PLACE FOR FUN, supra note 50 (emphasis added).
126. CELEBRATING 5 YEARS, supra note 110.
127. QUOTABLES, supra note 97 (quoting Bob Greene, columnist of The Chicago
Tribune).
128. See Sally Apgar, It's a Megamall World After All, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR
TRIB., Aug. 11, 1995, at 1A [hereinafter It's a Megamall World]. Other factors, such as the
renovation of other large shopping centers, may have also contributed to the decline.
However, as one area retail consultant stated in a 1995 interview: "[Pleople from out of the
city who used to go downtown now go to the Mall of America." Id. Indeed, a telephone
poll taken by Star-Tribune/WCCO-TV over November 27 to December 3, 1995, found that
of 1,018 adults polled, 18% who shop at the Mall of America shop in downtown St. Paul less
than in years past. The poll also found that downtown St. Paul, along with two other
shopping centers, was losing the most customers to the Mall of America. See Sally Apgar,
Confounding Critics, Mall Displays Staying Power, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR-TRIB., Dec.
10, 1995, at 1B [hereinafter Confounding Critics].
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with the Mall on a daily basis. Larry Carlson, a Minneapolis retail
consultant, states that "[t]here are people who will shoot me for
saying it, but the mall is serving as a new downtown. 1 29  One
Mall patron has said that "[slometimes I go [to the mall] for
entertainment. But mostly I go for shopping because everything
you need is right in the mall. Downtown St. Paul is more spread
out, so you have to go [sic] more places to find what you
need.'
130
A. Persuasive Precedent-New Jersey Coalition Against War in
the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp.
Precedent for recognizing the Mall of America as a function-
ing downtown can be found in numerous cases.t3 ' One of the
most recent cases-New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle
East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp. 32 -is also the most persuasive. In
1994, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed a ruling denying
access rights to a group of citizens desiring to conduct a leafleting
campaign at ten privately-owned malls. The purpose of the
leafleting was to protest United States intervention in the Middle
East upon Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990.2" In a lengthy
decision written by Chief Justice Wilentz, the court held that the
nature of the malls was such that they functioned as public spaces
and, therefore, they could not deny public free speech access.
1 4
The court built its analysis on prior New Jersey caselaw, most
specifically upon State v. Schmid.135  Schmid held that a private
129. It's a Megamall World, supra note 128. The same article later states "[a]s Carlson
and others see it, the Mall of America has become the new town square, the new downtown
retail district of the Twin Cities. The combination of entertainment and retail has given
people the wide variety of choices that they used to find only in downtown Minneapolis."
Id.
130. Confounding Critics, supra note 128 (quoting Ann Scherman). The article states
"[like it or not, the megamall has become an integral part of the state's culture and shopping
lives of many Minnesotans." Id. The article holds that the latest point of reference in
Minnesota is the Mall of America, rather than Lake Woebegon of days of old. See id.
131. See supra notes 84, 86 and accompanying text.
132. 650 A.2d 757 (N.J. 1994).
133. See id. at 762.
134. See id. at 783. The court did hold that the malls could impose reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions on the leafleting. See id. For similar provisions, see Westside
Sane/Freeze v. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., 274 Cal. Rptr. 51, 59 (1990); Bock v. Westminster Mall
Co., 819 P.2d 55, 63 (Colo. 1991); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, Inc. 445 N.E.2d 590, 591
(Mass. 1983); Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 A.2d 1382, 1390 (Pa. 1981); State v. Schmid, 423
A.2d 615, 630 (N.J. 1980).
135. 423 A.2d at 615.
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university could not unreasonably deny the exercise of political
speech to anyone who walked onto campus. 16 Princeton Univer-
sity, although a private institution, invited the public onto its
premises to such an extent that the property was deemed public for
constitutional purposes, and state free speech principles were held
to apply.37
Thus, by granting a speech right on private property under the
New Jersey Constitution, the New Jersey Supreme Court estab-
lished a standard to determine when public use necessitates
accompanying constitutional obligations. The standard is three-
pronged: (1) What is the normal use of the property?; (2) What is
the extent and nature of the public's invitation to use it?; and (3)
What is the purpose of the expressional activity in relation to both
136. See id. at 633. Chris Schmid, who was not a Princeton student, was charged with
trespass on private property after he distributed and sold United States Labor Party political
materials on campus. See id. at 616.
137. See id. at 631. In contrast, in 1993 a New Jersey court upheld a criminal trespass
ban on leafleting on a campus that was not held to be open to the public. See State v. Guice,
621 A.2d 553 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993). The Superior Court of New Jersey held that
Stevens Institute of Technology, a much smaller institution than Princeton University, made
a deliberate attempt to maintain the private nature of its campus, and thus its prohibition
against leafleting was upheld. See id. at 556.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has a history of expansively protecting individual free
speech rights over those of private property owners. In State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J.
1971), the unanimous court held that a private property owner who employs and houses
migrant farm workers may not deny the workers the right to receive government visitors
wishing to provide them with medical and legal advice. The Court did not support this
holding under Marsh because it did not find a direct correlation between a migrant camp and
the business district of Chickasaw, Alabama. See id. at 371. Nor did the court base its
reasoning upon the New Jersey trespass statute (two government workers were charged with
trespass when they entered a camp and refused to leave until they had a private audience
with one of the migrant workers), nor upon the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See id.
at 371-72.
Rather, the court held that New Jersey law does not provide the owner of private
property with the right to bar access to government services meant for migrant workers. See
id. The court chose to ground its holding upon this basis rather than on constitutional
considerations because doing so provided the migrant workers with a broader rights base.
See id. at 372. As the court stated, "[a] decision in nonconstitutional terms is more
satisfactory, because the interests of migrant workers are more expansively served in that
way than they would be if they had no more freedom than these constitutional concepts
could be found to mandate if indeed they apply at all." Id. Based on the fact that these
laborers had little, if any, access to such information, the court held it to be in their best
interests to meet with the state workers. See id. at 371-72. Private property rights are not
absolute, and the rights and needs of the migrant farm workers outweighed the property
owner's right to bar access to his property. See id. at 373. The court made a point of stating
that the property owner is under no obligation to open his property to the general public.
See id. at 374. Thus, traveling salesmen or solicitors were not guaranteed entry onto his land
unless barring them would deny the migrant workers access to needed items. See id.
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its private and public use?138 Considering Schmid, New Jersey
Coalition held that "[t]his 'multi-faceted' standard determines
whether private property owners may be required to permit, subject
to suitable restrictions, the reasonable exercise by individuals of the
constitutional freedoms of speech and assembly." '139
B. The First and Second Prongs of the Schmid Test
The Schmid test applies to the Mall of America situation
because the New Jersey Supreme Court explicitly states that the
test is to be employed to protect rights of speech and assembly.1"
After articulating the test, the Schmid court stated that "[t]his is a
multi-faceted test which must be applied to ascertain whether, in a
given case, owners of private property may be required to permit,
subject to suitable restrictions, the reasonable exercise by individ-
uals of the constitutional freedoms of speech and assembly. 141
In Schmid, the primary issue concerned the scope of free
speech.1 42  However, the court explicitly stated its intention to
also apply this test to assembly issues. The New Jersey Supreme
Court, applying this test in New Jersey Coalition fourteen years
after Schmid was decided, reiterated the intent that assembly rights
were to be included in the rights granted protection under the
Schmid test. 143  The court in New Jersey Coalition stated that it
would decide the case based on constitutional and common law
grounds;144 common law "lays a foundation that would vindicate
the exercise of speech and assembly rights in this setting. 1 45 The
court then conducted an analysis of New Jersey common law and,
from this analysis, held that free speech rights should be granted at
the shopping malls; however, reasonable restrictions of this right
would be allowed. 146
138. See Schmid, 423 A.2d at 630.
139. See New Jersey Coalition, 650 A.2d at 761. Similarly, in PruneYard, the United
States Supreme Court, while concerned with a free speech issue, held that its ruling covered
First Amendment rights, thus encompassing the freedom of assembly. See PruneYard
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
140. See Schmid, 423 A.2d at 630.
141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
143. See New Jersey Coalition, 650 A.2d at 761.
144. See id. at 777.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 783. It must be noted that the New Jersey Constitution provides a
fundamental right of free speech while the Minnesota Bill of Rights does not enumerate a
right to assemble. While this makes it easier for the New Jersey Supreme Court to ground
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This precedent for recognizing assembly rights as one of the
rights protected by the Schmid test weighs strongly in favor of
recognizing this right in a mall setting. Because this comment
advocates using the Schmid test as the standard against which the
Mall's Parental Escort Policy must be measured, it is of primary
importance that the test encompasses the right of assembly.
Further, New Jersey Coalition is the case most akin in scope to the
Mall of America cause of action. As it is argued that the New
Jersey Coalition precedent (for finding the New Jersey malls to be
public arenas) is strongly persuasive with regard to the Mall of
America,147 the New Jersey Supreme Court's recognition that the
Schmid test encompasses assembly rights should also be very
persuasive.148 Once recognized as such, the Minnesota courts can
rely on their common law tradition of extending individual liberties
to decide whether that tradition should be extended to encompass
assembly rights at malls. The Schmid test encompasses the right to
assemble on private property, the issue in question at the Mall of
America, and will thus be applied herein.
A comparison of the New Jersey Supreme Court's findings in
New Jersey Coalition with the situation at the Mall of America
assists in the determination of whether the Mall of America should
be deemed a functioning downtown. Under the first and second
Schmid prongs (which were jointly considered in New Jersey
Coalition), the court conducted a detailed fact-finding into the
normal use of the private property on which the restrictions were
imposed. In New Jersey Coalition, the defendants were ten very
large enclosed shopping centers,"' nine of which were regional
its decision, the lack thereof should not hinder the Minnesota Supreme Court. Again, an
argument can and should be made under article I, section 16 of the Minnesota Bill of Rights
for a right of peaceful assembly. See discussion infra Part IV.
147. See discussion infra notes 148-61.
148. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania cited Schmid in deciding a case of petition
rights on a college campus. See Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 A.2d 1382 (Pa. 1981). In
holding that a private Pennsylvania college must allow peaceful leaflet distribution (although
certain restrictions were allowed), the court cited the recent Schmid decision holding that
freedoms of speech and assembly apply to the distribution of political materials at Princeton
University. See id. at 1390. After citing Schmid, the court stated that being "[m]indful of
both this Commonwealth's great heritage of freedom and the compelling language of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, we likewise hold that, in certain circumstances, the state may
reasonably restrict the right to possess and use property in the interests of freedom of
speech, assembly, and petition." Id.
149. At various times the opinion refers to them as both shopping centers and as malls.
With the exception of Woodbridge Center, the defendants were all, as their names suggest,
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centers.150 The regional centers each had from 93 to 244 tenants
including department stores, restaurants, banks, entertainment
venues, travel agencies, hair salons, doctor's offices, and parking
facilities that held from 3,075 to 9,000 vehicles.'51 With gross
leasing areas ranging from 300,000 to 1,000,000 square feet, each of
these regional malls is considerably smaller than the Mall of
America, with its gross leasing area of 4.2 million square feet.
152
Each of the ten malls permitted non-shopping activities on its
property; some involved community and political speech.'
5 3
The court continued its factual analysis by examining
statistical information regarding the place of the mall in American
life. Citing statistics from shopping center authorities, the court
tracked the growth of the shopping center and the simultaneous
decline of many downtown shopping districts. 54  The court was
so persuaded by its findings that it held that "[r]egional and
community shopping centers significantly compete with and have
in fact significantly displaced downtown business districts as the
gathering point of citizens, both here in New Jersey and across
America.' 5 5  Asserting that shopping malls have become an
integral part of the American landscape, the court found that malls
have evolved to the point where the larger ones serve as the new
downtowns.
156
Considering the public's invitation to use the property (the
second Schmid prong), the court found that the contents of the
mall and the easy access to them justified the holding that the
private property was dedicated to public use."7 The New Jersey
Coalition court could have been referring to the Mall of America
when it held that "there is no property more thoroughly 'dedicated'
to public use than these regional and community shopping centers,
malls: The Mall at Short Hills, Cherry Hill Mall, Hamilton Mall, Monmouth Mall,
Quakerbridge Mall, Livingston Mall, The Mall at Mill Creek, Riverside Square, and
Rockaway Townsquare.
150. The tenth, a community center, was smaller in size and had less variety of stores
than the regional centers. Despite this fact, the court included it in its holding. The gross
leasable area of a community center ranges from 100,000 to 300,000 square feet. See New
Jersey Coalition, 650 A.2d at 763-74.
151. See id.
152. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
153. See New Jersey Coalition, 650 A.2d at 764.
154. See id. at 766-68.
155. Id. at 766 (emphasis added).
156. See id.
157. See id. at 771-72.
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a public use so pervasive that its all-embracing invitation to the
public necessarily includes the implied invitation for plaintiff's
leafleting.""' 8 The court based this holding equally upon: (1) the
nature of the stores in the malls and (2) the public invitation to
come the malls.'59
The Mall of America has established its reputation as a
complex that caters to almost every need and interest imaginable.
In doing so, it has made a concerted effort to welcome people of
all ages to its premises in order that they may partake of all that it
has to offer. Like the malls in New Jersey Coalition, the Mall of
America opened its doors not only for shopping and entertainment
purposes, but for the by-products thereof: the space that provides
places to sit down, relax, talk, or simply roam. Indeed, the New
Jersey Supreme Court noted that malls are intentionally designed
to provide breathing space to make them more attractive. 6 ° Such
space is intended to provide an additional reason for going to the
mall. This is to be distinguished from a strip-shopping center which
provides neither shelter from inclement weather nor the multitude
of places on which to sit down and relax. The court held that such
"non-retail uses, expressive and otherwise, underline the all-
inclusiveness of defendant's invitation to the people.' '161  Since
the malls act as a community gathering place, the court held that
they could not unreasonably prohibit community activities on their
premises.'62
Predating New Jersey Coalition is older precedent recognizing
free speech rights at privately-owned shopping centers or malls.'63
Based on this precedent, and in particular the similarities between
the malls at issue in New Jersey Coalition with the Mall of America,
158. See New Jersey Coalition, 650 A.2d at 771-72.
159. See id. at 773-74. "The multiplicity of uses reflects the intention to bring the entire
community-its citizens and its activities-into the center. The uses and invitation, in effect,
reconstitute the community, conveniently, under one roof." Id.
160. See id. at 773.
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. See Bock v. Westminster Mall Co. 819 P.2d 55, 62 (Colo. 1991) (holding that "we
are also persuaded that the Mall functions as the equivalent of a downtown business
district"); Alderwood Assoc. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 635 P.2d 108, 117 (Wash. 1981)
(holding that "[t]he shopping center now performs a traditional public function by providing
the functional equivalent of a town center or business block"); Robins v. PruneYard
Shopping Ctr. 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal. 1979); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, Inc., 445
N.E.2d 590, 591-92 (Mass. 1983). The latter two cases place substantial emphasis on the
nature of the mall in question.
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there is a secure basis for asserting that the Mall of America
functions as a Bloomington/Minneapolis downtown district. The
third prong of the Schmid test-the compatibility of the free speech
exercised with the use of the property-is necessary to complete
the analysis. This prong is in fact the most important prong for
analysis purposes. While the normal use of the property and the
nature of the public's invitation to use it " are relatively easily
analyzed, the third prong is the decisive prong of the analysis:
what is the nature of the teenagers' actions at the Mall, and can
those actions be protected under the state constitution? It has
been shown in Part II that no federal First Amendment rights exist
on private property. However, a right such as freedom to assemble
at the Mall of America may be granted by the Minnesota Constitu-
tion. Numerous issues must be considered in granting such a right,
the most important of which is the nature of the teenagers' actions
at the Mall.
C The Third Prong of the Schmid Test-The Nature of the
Teenagers' Presence at the Mall on Weekend Evenings
"The main issue is they [teens] yell and use abusive language
and for the most part don't respect authority," said Teresa
McFarland. "The majority of the kids don't act that way but the
small percentage who do ruin it for the rest.
165
The purpose of the expressional activity in relation to both the
Mall's private and public use goes to the heart of the curfew.16"
Beginning with the basic facts, anywhere from 2,000 to 3,000
teenagers go to the Mall of America on weekend evenings, and the
majority of the teens are black. 167 Weekend nights are the only
time when large groups of black teenagers visit the Mall.
168
164. See supra Part III.
165. Apgar, supra note 14.
166. The last prong of the Schmid test was discussed separately and in great length by
the court. As this prong concerns constitutional considerations of First Amendment type
rights, it is perhaps the most weighty of the three prongs.
167. See Meredith, supra note 7; Karl Vick, Mall and Order in Minnesota, WASH. POST,
Sept. 18, 1996, at 1A (stating that "the Mall of America prides itself on its good relations
with the community, and although management flatly refuses to say so, most of the young
people gathering on weekend nights are black").
168. See Meredith, supra note 7 (quoting Marcus Wilson, an eighteen year-old who
frequents the Mall of America). Yusef Mgeni, President of the Urban Coalition in the Twin
Cities, has said that most teenagers who go to the Mall on weekend nights are low income,
young people of color. Telephone Interview with Yusef Mgeni, President of the Urban
Coalition in the Twin Cities (Sept. 25, 1996).
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While most of the teens go to the Mall to "hang out," some do
exercise their shopping power.169  The Mall of America has
repeatedly stated that it considered and then implemented the
curfew because the large groups of teenagers disturbed other
shoppers and tenants and posed a possible safety hazard.17°
Indeed, the behavior exhibited by some of the teens can only be
described as obnoxious. Numerous incidents have occurred of
teens chasing each other throughout the Mall, loudly using foul
language, and even spitting over the railings at shoppers below.171
Groups congregate at Knott's Camp Snoopy, the rotunda, and the
East Broadway entrance.172 Other groups block store entrances,
and this intimidates many Mall shoppers.173 They often dress in
169. See Meredith, supra note 7. Teenagers choose to congregate along the railings
where they can talk and watch other teens. See id. Some shop and are the main customers
of certain Mall stores. See id.
170. In June 1996, Teresa McFarland stated that "[wle are dealing with too many
unsupervised kids here who are acting disorderly, causing commotions, intimidating guests
and preventing mall merchants from doing business." Apgar, supra note 14. Teresa
McFarland has further stated that 80 percent of Mall stores support the juvenile curfew. See
Beckham, supra note 19.
Ms. McFarland has also stated:
Well, we've seen a very sharp increase in the number of kids that have been
coming to the mall on the weekend nights, and within that a growing percentage
of kids are acting up, they're at times getting into fights, we've found weapons on
kids, we've had both kids and other guests that have been injured. Now nothing
has been serious, but this policy is a pro-active attempt of poten-to-to prevent
the potential for something more serious to happen.
Interview with Teresa McFarland, Spokeswoman for the Mall of America (Oct. 6, 1996)
(NBC television broadcast).
However, as the store manager of the Nature Company stated, "[t]here are tons of
good kids out there who are being punished by this ... [a]nd I think it's going to affect our
traffic." Haga, supra note 7, at 4 (quoting Linda Korenby).
171. See Meredith, supra note 7.
172. See Kimberly Hayes Taylor, Mighty Moms Make Mark at Megamall, MINNEAPOLIS-
ST. PAUL STAR-TRIB., Apr. 27, 1996.
173. See id.
On Saturday nights, large groups of young people have begun to congregate. No
one likes to use the word "gangs," and in our racially sensitive times mall officials
are reluctant to discuss the racial tensions inherent in what has gone on. But it
has been reported that problems arise when, according to the Minneapolis Star-
Tribune, the young people begin "blocking store entrances, intimidating other
shoppers and sometimes walking in groups that swell to 50 people."
Greene, supra note 10. The Conduct Code handed out to teenagers entering the Mall
includes the provision that "[a]ppropriate non-offensive attire, including shirts and shoes,
must be worn." Mall of America, Conduct Code (1996).
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what is assumed to be gang-related apparel, which further frightens
some Mall shoppers.'74
Prior to the curfew, the Mall had a Conduct Code in place"'
and Mall guards were required to ask teenagers in groups of three
to keep moving.'76 However, while the Mall has its own security
staff, management decided something more needed to be done to
deal with the number of unsupervised teens. Thus, they originally
implemented three new methods: (1) added security; (2) a Youth
Liaison Program; and (3) the Mighty Moms 77 The Mighty
Moms program has been very successful. It consists of nineteen
mothers, eighteen of whom are black, who are present at the Mall
on weekend evenings and serve to diffuse confrontations between
Mall security and the teens.'78 Often a yelling match erupts
174. Paul T. Barnes, a shopkeeper at the Mall, has stated that on weekend nights many
of his older customers are scared away by the teenagers who congregate outside his store,
"70 percent of them under the age of 20 and minority and wearing gang-related appar-
el .... [A] lot of people are not used to seeing large numbers of kids and large numbers
of minority kids." Meredith, supra note 7.
Mall management has presented no evidence that fewer people have visited the Mall
since the gun-related incidences. An issue that presents itself is whether Mall management
intended the curfew not only to keep out the few violent teens, but also to provide an
atmosphere more conducive to shoppers who feel intimidated by the large number of
minority teens at the Mall. The Mall could have banned the violent and disruptive teenagers
to achieve the first goal. With only a handful of gun related incidences, it surely is practical
to provide Mall security, and especially security posted at Mall entrances, with pictures and
names of the violent teens, in order that they can be recognized and refused entrance to the
Mall. The Mall firmly denies a motive for implementing the Parental Escort Policy other
than keeping the Mall environment safe. See Meredith, supra note 7 (quoting both Teresa
McFarland and Virgil Heatwole). Such an analysis into the Mall's motives is beyond the
scope of this comment, but the issue is raised for further inquiry.
175. The Conduct Code of the Mall of America is a small, 5 x 8 " piece of paper with
seven bullet headings that serve as the rules. The headings cover everything from disorderly
conduct, loitering, and picketing, to attire and the disallowance of pets. At the bottom of
the paper, in smaller print, is the information regarding the Parental Escort Policy. It in-
cludes the information necessary for obtaining a Minnesota State Identification Card which
allows teenagers without driver's licenses or passports to provide acceptable identification.
176. See Taylor, supra note 172.
177. See September Press Release, supra note 9.
178. As one newspaper article states, the Mighty Moms have a good rapport with the
teens because "the 'moms' say they can speak the same language. They may use the same
words as security officials, but with a different tone, a gentler touch." Taylor, supra note
172. The Mighty Moms are paid $20 per hour for five hour shifts and are trained, as they
say, in "verbal judo." See Karlen, supra note 9. While security and police handle violent
incidences at the Mall, the Moms "are especially effective in heading off incidents that can
be defused better with a friendly chat than with a badge." Id. The fact is, most kids will
listen to a mom. Not only is there less authority tension between the Mighty Moms and the
teenagers, but there is less (if any) racial tension as well.
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between a teen (or group of teens) and Mall security when the
teens are forced to leave the Mall due to a conduct violation. At
this point, or before tempers rise, the Mighty Moms will step in,
talk with the teens, and help them accept the guards' decision while
lending the unhappy teens a sympathetic ear. 79
While the Mighty Moms have been very successful, Mall
management believed further action was necessary to cope with
what they perceived to be a potential safety risk. Hence, they
instituted the Parental Escort Policy. In a September 4, 1996 press
release, the Mall's stated rationale behind the policy was to "reduce
the growing number of unsupervised youth at the Mall on weekend
nights., 180  Mall management obviously believed that parental
supervision of anyone younger than sixteen would lead to a safer
Mall atmosphere.'81 As previously discussed, serious violent
incidents have already occurred at the Mall; two involved guns.
18
1
While no by-standers were hurt, the Mall management implement-
ed the policy because, in its own words, "the risk of a serious
incident continues to increase."' 83 Indeed, before the policy was
put into effect, the Mall Conduct Code was violated numerous
times every weekend.)" The weekend after the escort policy was
implemented, the Mall's press release stated that fewer rules were
violated, there were no fights between kids, and more families
came to the Mall.
8 5
Are the purposes of teen assembly compatible with the uses
of the property? The answer to this question depends on which
teens are referred to. For the teens who misbehave and are
violent, the answer is a resounding no. The Mall of America was
never intended to be a baby-sitter for rowdy Minnesota teens who
have no other place to go. While the Mall serves numerous
179. When teens are asked to leave the Mall, they are escorted to the transportation
center where they are put on a bus that will take them home. See Taylor, supra note 172.
180. September Press Release, supra note 9.
181. Due to the fact that many unsupervised kids go to the Mall of America, the Mall
management states that it is "committed to controlling this situation by asking parents or
guardians to be accountable for the actions of children in their care." Id. Virgil H.
Heatwole, a Mall manager, has said that he "hoped the policy would result in children
bringing their parents to the mall. 'I think society itself, we need to look at where parents
are today."' Meredith, supra note 7.
182. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
183. September Press Release, supra note 9.
184. See Public Relations Dep't, Mall of America, Press Release (Oct. 8, 1996) [herein-
after October Press Release].
185. See id.
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purposes, many teens who go to the Mall and gather in large
groups on weekend evenings do not partake in either the activities
offered or the shopping. Rather, by their presence, they intimidate
some people who go there to shop, be entertained, or both. Also,
storekeepers have complained that teens do a good deal of
shoplifting on weekend nights, further eroding Mall consumer-
ism."8 The Mall's owners do have an interest in protecting their
investment, and the presence of the rowdy and violent teens does
pose a threat to the reputational value of the Mall.
These arguments persuasively establish that violent teenagers
and teenagers who continually misbehave should be denied Mall
access. However, the arguments do not overcome the fact that the
vast majority of teens present at the Mall on weekend evenings do
act in accordance with the purposes of the Mall and pose no safety
threat. While the Mall would arguably prefer its patrons to
participate in the activities it offers, like a downtown district it has
opened its space to people who may only want to hang-out.
Indeed, as New Jersey Coalition states, the public's invitation to the
mall property "is not just an invitation to shop, but to do whatever
one would do downtown, including doing very little of any-
thing.
'187
Once it has so opened its doors, the Mall of America should
not be allowed to close them without greater justification. The fact
that some shoppers are intimidated by large groups of teens at the
Mall on weekend evenings does not justify the implementation of
an across-the-board juvenile curfew. Indeed, as the United States
Supreme Court has held, "mere public intolerance or animosity
cannot be the basis for abridgment of these [free assembly and
association] constitutional freedoms."1" The Court so held in
1971 when it struck down a Cincinnati ordinance making it illegal
for three or more people to assemble on a sidewalk and conduct
themselves "in a manner annoying to persons passing by." '189 As
in the Mall of America situation, a charge was also made that the
186. See Sally Apgar, Megamall's Plan for Required Escorts Praised, Assailed, MINNEAP-
OLIS-ST. PAUL STAR-TRIB., June 21, 1996, at lB.
187. New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650
A.2d 757, 761 (N.J. 1994) (emphasis added). The court further stated that the malls have
"substantially displaced the downtown business districts as the centers of commercial and
social activity." Id. at 767 (emphasis added).
188. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971).
189. Id. at 611.
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ordinance was enforced disproportionately:19 ° "[A]nd such a
prohibition, in addition, contains an obvious invitation to discrimi-
natory enforcement against those whose association together is
'annoying' because their ideas, their lifestyle, or their physical
appearance is resented by the majority of their fellow citizens.""19
Due to the fact that the majority of the teens who are at the Mall
on weekend evenings are black and the patrons are white, the
appearance of a discriminatory motive in implementing the curfew
is present. The teens speak and dress differently from the older
adults at the Mall, and it is their appearance and speech which
older people find intimidating. If some Mall patrons feel intimidat-
ed by seeing the large groups of black teens at the Mall, such
feelings do not justify a prohibition on the teenager's access to the
Mall.
19 2
Furthermore, the Mall has not stated or implied that fewer
people go to the Mall due to teen misbehavior, and no statistics
have shown that the Mall's revenues have decreased following the
teen shooting incidents. As Mall spokeswoman Teresa McFarland
has said, most of the teens at the Mall are well behaved. She
stated: "We have a lot of unsupervised young people on Saturday
nights .... [T]hey should be supervised by parents or other adults,
but they aren't. Most are good kids. But a small percentage won't
follow any mall rules or obey any authority figures .,19 Bob
Lutz, the Bloomington police chief, has stated that "[m]ost of the
trouble with teens is rowdy behavior and bad language, but nothing
criminal." '194 He also says claims of gang activity are overblown:
"Gang activity isn't running when you're supposed to walk or
swearing." '195 The Mall has even been called safer than the
streets.'96 By May 7, 1996, the Mall had let it be known that a
juvenile curfew was under consideration. Lottie Dixon, one of the
190. See id. at 616, n.6. For one allegation that Mall of America employees hand out the
Mall rules to black youth more often than to white youth, see Meredith, supra note 7.
191. Coates, 402 U.S. at 616.
192. See TRIBE, supra note 88, § 15-18, at 1409 (stating that "[i]f simply finding another's
appearance or habits offensive to hear, see, or think about were enough to justify
exclusionary regulation, rights of personhood and indeed of expression would be at an end").
193. Greene, supra note 10 (emphasis added).
194. Apgar, supra note 186.
195. Id. Further, on September 18, 1996, after the gun-related incidents had occurred,
Chief Lutz stated: "[L]et's be clear ... we're talking about non-criminal conduct by a bunch
of snotty-nosed kids." See Vick, supra note 167.
196. See Taylor, supra note 172.
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Mighty Moms, was quoted in the Minneapolis-St. Paul Star-Tribune
as follows: "[T]he mall, she said, is much safer than the
streets."197
In concluding the Schmid third prong analysis, this comment
does not argue that all teens should be allowed in the Mall of
America. Those who have displayed violent behavior, whether
teens or adults, should not be allowed in the Mall. Those who
have repeatedly broken the Mall's Conduct Code do not deserve
to be in the Mall. But this comment does not advocate denying
access rights to all teens when only a small number misbehave. To
stereotype all teens as undeserving to be in the Mall is not simply
grossly unfair but, this comment argues, violative of their assembly
rights. Little justification can be found in informing the well-
behaved teens that they are not welcome at the Mall unless
accompanied by an adult. As the Mall management itself has said,
the majority of the teens at the Mall on weekend evenings are well-
behaved. Some of them do shop while they are there, and the
curfew has actually hurt some storekeepers who cater to a younger
clientele.19 Indeed, many storekeepers and customers say that
the policy doesn't work because teens who enter the Mall before
6 p.m. and who are not rowdy do not get checked for identification
by Mall security.199
The Mall specifically encourages teens to come to its premises
by catering to their entertainment and shopping needs."' 0 The
fact that most of the teens choose to just 'hang-out' on the
premises is in no way incompatible with the Mall's purposes. New
Jersey Coalition reiterated that the more a private property owner
opens his/her property to the public, the "more do his rights
become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of
those who use it." ' The question then arises whether an argu-
ment can be made under existing Minnesota constitutional and
statutory law for recognizing teenagers' assembly rights at the Mall.
197. Id.
198. For example, Claire's, an accessory store that caters to young girls, now has less
weekend business as its shoppers go to other area malls where they do not need escorts. See
Preeti Gupta, Mall Workers Give Mixed Reviews to Curfew, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR
TRIB., July 7, 1997, at 6B. See also Apgar, supra note 186.
199. See Gupta, supra note 198.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 115-19.
201. New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650
A.2d 757, 775-76 (N.J. 1994) (quoting Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946)).
1998]
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IV. Does Minnesota Law Protect Freedom of Assembly Rights
on Private Property?
A. The Minnesota Constitution and Caselaw
There is no affirmative grant of freedom of assembly rights on
private property in the Minnesota Constitution. Furthermore,
unlike the Federal Constitution, the Minnesota Constitution has no
express provision granting freedom of assembly rights whatso-
ever.2 2 There is very little Minnesota caselaw on the subject of
assembly rights. However, none of these cases approximate the
cause of action contemplated by this comment. In 1939, the
Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Winkels2 °3 struck down an
overbroad assembly statute, while in State v. Hipp204 the state
upheld the current unlawful assembly statute. The statute in Hipp
has little bearing on the teenagers' cause of action as the statute is
meant to provide police action after the fact and the Parental
Escort Policy is a preventative measure. The language of the
statute states that
[w]hen three or more persons assemble, each participant is
guilty of unlawful assembly, which is a misdemeanor, if the
assembly is: (1) With intent to commit any unlawful act by
force; or (2) With intent to carry out any purpose in such
manner as will disturb or threaten the public peace; or (3)
Without unlawful purpose, but the participants so conduct
themselves in a disorderly manner as to disturb or threaten the
public peace.2 5
The Hipp court upheld the constitutionality of the statute by
refusing to find it vague or overbroad.216 The third case, State v.
Johnson,2° 7 is only tangentially related to assembly rights. John-
202. See U.S. CONST., amend. I.
203. 283 N.W. 763 (Minn. 1939). The statute which was struck down provided that
[w]henever three or more persons, having assembled for any purpose, shall disturb
the public peace by using force or violence to any other person or to property, or
shall threaten or attempt to commit such disturbance, or to do an unlawful act by
the use of force or violence, accompanied with the power of immediate execution
of such threat or attempt, they shall be guilty of a riot.
Id. at 764.
204. 213 N.W.2d 610 (Minn. 1973).
205. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.705 (West 1987).
206. See Hipp, 213 N.W.2d at 614-15.
207. 163 N.W.2d 750 (Minn. 1968).
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son was concerned with whether the defendants' had breached the
peace in violation of a state ordinance by gathering in downtown
Minneapolis to protest the Vietnam War. ° s The court held that
the police officer's attempt to maintain order by arresting them was
within the bounds of the ordinance and did not abridge the
defendants' rights of free speech and assembly.2 9  The case was
decided in favor of the defendants, however, when the court found
that there was insufficient evidence to prove that those arrested
had actually violated the ordinance.21
Thus, there is very little upon which to base an affirmative
right for teenager assembly rights in the existing Minnesota
assembly caselaw.211  However, a court may grant a specific
individual liberty by considering the circumstances leading up to a
cause of action and using its own precedent as a guide to the type
of individual rights previously recognized. Minnesota caselaw
provides a rich history of protecting individual liberties that were
unimaginable to the writers of the Minnesota Bill of Rights. By
working within this rich tradition and recognizing the need for
affirmative assembly rights, there exists a strong argument for the
creation of an affirmative assembly right under the Minnesota
212Constitution.
21
Article I, section 16, of the Minnesota Constitution holds that
"[t]he enumeration of rights in this constitution shall not deny or
impair others retained by and inherent in the people." 13 Actions
208. See id. at 751.
209. See id. at 754-55.
210. See id. at 755.
211. While a detailed analysis of federal decisions dealing with assembly rights is
necessary for a more complete argument, such analysis is beyond the scope of this comment.
Indeed, while the First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that Congress
shall not abridge the peoples' freedom to assemble, similar to the Minnesota Supreme Court,
the United States Supreme Court has heard relatively few cases regarding freedom of
assembly.
One United States Supreme Court case bearing on the Mall of America situation is
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971). In Coates, the Court struck down a Cincin-
nati ordinance making it a criminal offense for "three or more persons to assemble ... on
any of the sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons
passing by, or occupants of adjacent buildings." Id. at 611 n.1. The Court held the
ordinance void for vagueness, as "[c]onduct that annoys some people does not annoy others."
Id. at 614. For a further discussion of Coates, see supra text accompanying notes 187-90.
212. Although this comment forcefully argues for a right of teenager assembly based on
article I, section 16 of the Minnesota Constitution, the Minnesota courts may look to other
jurisdictions to help them in their determination of whether such a right ought to be granted.
213. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16.
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for the recognition of individual liberties have been successfully
brought, in whole or in part, under this clause.214  The Minnesota
Supreme Court has liberally interpreted this clause, thus providing
constitutional protection for individual liberties not specifically
enumerated in the state constitution. 215  Based on the state
supreme court's liberal reading of the Minnesota constitution as
granting protection for unenumerated individual liberties, it would
be in keeping with this reading for the court to recognize teenagers'
assembly rights at the Mall of America.
It has been established that under federal law there exist no
First Amendment protections at privately owned malls; however,
PruneYard affirmed states' rights to interpret their constitutions as
providing more individual liberty protections than the Federal
Constitution.216  The Minnesota Supreme Court has actively
utilized its state constitution as a fertile source of individual rights
protections. 217  In 1985, the Minnesota Supreme Court expressly
recognized this utilized power in State v. Fuller,218 a decision
which has been heavily relied upon. The Fuller court stated that
"[i]t is axiomatic that a state supreme court may interpret its own
state constitution to offer greater protection of individual rights
than does the federal constitution., 219  Following is an analysis of
the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of its state Bill of
Rights. This analysis will show that the Minnesota Supreme Court
has consistently placed a high premium on individual liberties by
supporting their protection through an expansive reading of the
state Bill of Rights. By its nature, this survey cannot be conclusive
214. See discussion infra notes 230-54.
215. See discussion infra notes 230-54.
216. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
217. See In re Welfare of E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779 (Minn. 1993); State v. Hershberger, 462
N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990); State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1987); State v. Fuller, 374
N.W.2d 722 (Minn. 1985).
218. 374 N.W.2d at 722.
219. Id. at 726. The court went on to state that:
Indeed, as the highest court of this state, we are independently responsible for
safeguarding the rights of [our] citizens .... State courts are, and should be, the
first line of defense for individual liberties within the federalist system. This, of
course, does not mean that we will or should cavalierly construe our constitution
more expansively than the United States Supreme Court has construed the federal
constitution. Indeed, a decision of the United States Supreme Court interpreting
a comparable provision of the federal constitution that, as here, is textually
identical to a provision of our constitution, is of inherently persuasive, although
not necessarily compelling, force.
Id. at 726-27 (citations omitted).
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as to how the Minnesota Supreme Court would rule if the Mall of
America's curfew was to be challenged. Rather, it first provides
the background for one avenue of analysis the court may utilize in
this hypothetical cause of action; secondly, it resolves the issue in
a manner consistent with precedent in honoring heretofore
unrecognized individual liberties protections.22 °
Unlike the Federal Constitution, the Minnesota Bill of Rights
is placed first in the Minnesota Constitution. At least one
commentator has noted that this is perhaps as strong an indication
as any of Minnesota's commitment to the protection of individual
liberties.221 The Minnesota Bill of Rights contains seventeen
separate sections enumerating the rights granted therein.222
However, while it enumerates separate rights, the Bill of Rights is
not meant to be exclusive. As previously stated, article I, section
16 of the Minnesota constitution reads: "The enumeration of rights
in this constitution shall not be construed to deny or impair others
retained by and inherent in the people. '2 23  Regarding the inter-
pretation of this provision, the Minnesota Supreme Court held in
Thiede v. Town of Scandia Valley224 that while the state constitu-
tion "specifically recognizes the right to 'life, liberty or prop-
erty' . . . [it] does not attempt to enumerate all 'the rights or
privileges secured to any citizen thereof.' 25  Thus, as far back as
1944, the Minnesota high court held it unlawful for the state to
220. Because this cause of action is of first impression anywhere, this background into
Minnesota caselaw can do no more than provide the history of the Minnesota Supreme
Court's stance regarding individual liberties issues and argue for continued expansive
protection in the case of teenagers' assembly rights at the Mall of America. While it will be
proven that the Minnesota Supreme Court has consistently broadly interpreted article I,
section 16 of its Bill of Rights, this author is well aware that such liberal interpretations may
not necessarily translate to an extension of these holdings to the issue at the Mall of Amer-
ica. See Fiesta Mall Venture v. Mecham Recall Comm., 767 P.2d 719, 721 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1988); Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic Policy Comm., 780 P.2d 1282, 1286
(Wash. 1989).
221. See Fred L. Morrison, An Introduction to the Minnesota Constitution, 20 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 287, 299 (1994) (providing a detailed history of the Minnesota
Constitution and a framework for raising state claims under the Minnesota Bill of Rights).
222. See MINN. CONST. art. I, §§ 1-17. Of special interest to this comment are article I,
section 2 (Rights and Privileges); article I, section 13 (Private Property for Public Use); and
article I, section 16 (Freedom of Conscience).
223. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16.
224. 14 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1944).
225. See id. at 405.
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forcibly remove an alleged pauper and relocate him against his
will.226 The court held that a property owner cannot be forcibly
removed from his land and placed in a legal settlement for poor
relief reasons even though, in the past, a state statute allowed such
state action.227  Rather, the individual's right to be free from this
restraint on his liberty took precedence over the asserted state
interest.
Since Thiede, the Minnesota Supreme Court has continued to
interpret its constitution broadly to afford rights not expressly
enumerated therein. Indeed, Thiede's support of unenumerated
rights, coupled with Fuller's recognition that the Minnesota
Constitution may offer more rights than the Federal Constitution,
has proved to be a powerful one-two punch for the support of
individual liberties under Minnesota constitutional law. For
example, citing both Fuller and Thiede, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has held that while no express right of privacy is enumerated
under its constitution, one exists and is recognized by the Minne-
sota Constitution.22 In State v. Gray, the court was faced with a
constitutional challenge to a state sodomy statute. The defendant
argued that the statute infringed on his right of privacy to have
consensual, for-hire homosexual sex. Holding otherwise, the court
decided that while the state constitution does recognize an
unenumerated right of privacy, the court would not extend that
right to commercial sex.229 The court did not decide whether the
sodomy statute was unconstitutional when prostitution was not
involved. Thus, while the defendant in Gray lost, all Minnesotans
226. See id. at 406. The court held that town supervisors who continue to unlawfully
remove a pauper from his home will be personally liable for actual and punitive damages
stemming from the removal. See id. at 407-08.
227. Noting that a man's home is his castle, the court held this concept to be older than
the Magna Carta and embedded in both the Declaration of Independence and in the Bill of
Rights of the Federal and Minnesota Constitutions. See id. at 405.
228. See State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1987).
229. See id. at 114. The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the federal right of privacy
enunciated in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and extended this right to the
Minnesota Constitution. See Gray, 413 N.W.2d at 111. One year before the Gray decision,
the United States Supreme Court had decided Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986),
holding that federal guarantees of privacy rights do not encompass the right to engage in
homosexual sex. By the time Mr. Gray's case reached the Minnesota Supreme Court, he was
preempted from arguing under the Federal Constitution. Although he may have chosen to
argue under federal law if able to do so (were Bowers not yet decided), his argument under
the Minnesota Constitution had the lasting effect of providing Minnesotans with a recognized
right of privacy under their own state Bill of Rights. This right is clear and distinct from a
correlative right under the Federal Constitution.
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won as the right to privacy was recognized under Minnesota
law." °  The court specifically held that Minnesotans' right to
privacy under their state constitution equaled that under the
Federal Constitution; nevertheless, no specific sections of the
Minnesota Constitution were cited to support this conclusion. 23'
The Minnesota Supreme Court has also expanded its constitu-
tion's individual liberties protections in the area of criminal law,
providing more safeguards to the accused with regard to searches
and seizures than does the Fourth Amendment. In In re Welfare
of E.D.J.,232 the court declined to adopt the United States Su-
preme Court's Fourth Amendment seizure definition in California
v. Hodari D.233 Hodari held that a seizure only occurs when
physical force is used to restrain a person's movements or when a
person physically submits to a show of police authority.' This
definition was significantly narrower than the Minnesota concept of
seizure. Minnesota had been applying the Mendenhall/Royer
approach 23 as consistent with the state constitution. Under the
Mendenhall/Royer approach, a seizure occurs when a reasonable
person in the defendant's shoes would have concluded that s/he was
230. In Gray, the court stated:
[A] comparison of the Minnesota Bill of Rights with the federal constitutional
provisions upon which the right of privacy is founded shows that the rights
protected by the Federal Constitution are also protected by the Minnesota Bill of
Rights. Accordingly, it is our opinion that there does exist a right of privacy
guaranteed under and protected by the Minnesota Bill of Rights.
Gray, 413 N.W.2d at 111. The court went on to state that the scope of this right extends
only to fundamental rights. See id.
For a comprehensive history of privacy rights under the Minnesota Constitution, see
Michael K. Steenson, Fundamental Rights in the "Gray" Area: The Right of Privacy Under
the Minnesota Constitution, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 383 (1994).
231. The court anchored its right to privacy in its state Bill of Rights one year later in
Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. 1987). Mr. Jarvis was a mental patient committed
against his will. See id. at 140-41. He successfully challenged the forcible administration of
neuroleptic drugs to him in non-emergency situations. See id. at 148. The state supreme
court held that the forcible administration of the drugs violated his privacy rights anchored
in article I, sections 1, 2, and 10 of the state constitution. See id. at 148. The court stated
that "[a]lthough judicial recognition of a constitutional right of privacy in Minnesota may be
relatively recent, the protection of bodily integrity has been rooted firmly in our law for
centuries." Id. at 148-49.
232. 502 N.W.2d 779 (Minn. 1993).
233. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
234. See E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d at 781. In Hodari, the Court held that under the Fourth
Amendment, "[ain arrest requires either force (as described above) or, where that is absent,
submission to the assertion of authority." Hodari, 499 U.S. at 626.
235. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544
(1980).
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not free to leave and walk away from the police in such a situa-
tion.236 E.D.J. was a juvenile who was standing with two adults
on a known drug-trafficking street corner. 237  As a police car ap-
proached, the three began walking in the opposite direction. The
vehicle stopped behind them, and the officers ordered them to stop
walking.238  As the two men stopped, E.D.J. kept walking,
dropped something, and eventually turned around. E.D.J. was later
arrested for possession of crack cocaine obtained from a search and
seizure. 9  The state supreme court reversed E.D.J.'s district
court conviction and refused to adopt the Hodari approach.24
Instead of applying the pre-Hodari, Mendenhall/Royer approach
articulated above, the court "exercis[ed its] independent authority
to interpret [its] own state constitution ... .,,24' As a result, the
court held that E.D.J. was seized by the police and that the stop
was illegal because the police were unable to articulate a sufficient
basis for the stop.
242
One of the most frequently cited cases for an individual
liberties protection argument under the Minnesota Constitution is
State v. Hershberger.243 In Hershberger, the Supreme Court of
Minnesota held that a Minnesota Statute requiring the use of a
Slow Moving Vehicles ("SMV") sticker on Amish buggies violated
article I, section 16 of the Minnesota Constitution.2" In addition
to declaring that the enumerated rights of the constitution were not
all inclusive,245 the court noted that section 16 provided highly
detailed freedom of religion protections. 246 The Amish had stated
236. See E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d at 782 (setting forth the Minnesota Supreme Court's full
articulation of the Mendenhall/Royer standard).
237. See id. at 780.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. See id. at 783.
241. E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d at 783.
242. See id.
243. 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990).
244. See id. at 399.
245. See id. at 398 (citing State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 726 (1985)).
246. See id. The entire text of article I, section 16 provides:
Freedom of Conscience; no preference to be given to any religious establishment or
mode of worship.
The enumeration of rights in this constitution shall not deny or impair
others retained by and inherent in the people. The right of every man to worship
God according to the dictates of his own conscience shall never be infringed; nor
shall any man be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or
to maintain any religious or ecclesiastical ministry, against his consent; nor shall
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that their religious beliefs forbade the use of such symbols.
247
Realizing that the proposed use of the sticker was for safety
purposes, it was suggested that the Amish use reflective tape and
red lanterns which would not violate their religious tenets. 248 The
Minnesota Supreme Court agreed and held that the Amish could
use the tape and lanterns instead of the SMV stickers. However,
on certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, the case was
remanded to the state high court for a determination under the
compelling state interest/least restrictive means test.249
On remand, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the state
statute violated this test.25 ° While public safety had to be served,
the court believed that, under the Minnesota Constitution, public
safety could be balanced with religious freedom to produce a result
that would satisfy both. "Thus, while the terms 'compelling state
interest' and 'least restrictive alternative' are creatures of federal
doctrine, concepts embodied therein can provide guidance as we
seek to strike a balance under the Minnesota Constitution between
freedom of conscience and the state's public safety interest.' ' 251
The court went on to recognize that religious freedoms have
traditionally been treated with high respect by the court.252  In
deference to this history, and in light of the fact that the state never
proved that white reflective tape and red lanterns were inadequate
safety precautions, the court held that the law violated the state
constitution.2 3
Furthermore, there exists no explicit right in the Minnesota
Constitution to grant criminal defendants the right to consult with
an attorney before submitting to an intoxilizer test, but the
Minnesota Supreme Court granted this right in Freidman v.
any control of or interference with the rights of conscience be permitted, or any
preference be given by law to any religious establishment or mode of worship; but
the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts
of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the
state, nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of any
religious societies or theological seminaries.
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16.
247. See Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d at 395.
248. See id. at 399.
249. See Minnesota v. Hershberger, 495 U.S. 910 (1990).
250. See Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d at 399.
251. Id. at 398.
252. See id.
253. See id. at 399.
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Commissioner of Public Safety.254  The court has also held that
the Minnesota Constitution requires juries of twelve in all criminal
cases."s  Although the United States Supreme Court had held
that juries of less than twelve are allowed in certain non-capital
criminal offenses, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the
intent of the framers of the state constitution was to require twelve
jurors even in misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor cases.26 In
granting this right, the court held that it "must remain indepen-
dently responsible for safeguarding the rights of our own citizens
and for insuring that the intent of the people of Minnesota in
adopting our constitution is continued forward." '257
Hershberger, Fuller, Gray, E.D.J., Friedman, Hamm, and Jarvis
all form a strong basis upon which a claim for a teenagers' right to
assemble at the Mall of America can be established. As has been
shown, Minnesota began a trend towards basing individual liberties
protections in its state constitution with Thiede.258 The Mall of
America situation is unique in that, unlike the other cases herein
discussed, this situation could only occur in Minnesota. That this
situation is uniquely Minnesotan in nature and ought to be
determined under Minnesota law can be most forcibly argued
under Jarvis v. Levine.259 Deciding a mental patient's right under
the Minnesota Constitution to refuse the administration of
neuroleptic drugs in nonemergency situations, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that "[w]e are faced with the rights of persons
committed to Minnesota institutions, pursuant to Minnesota law, by
the courts of this state. Given the significant state law issues
involved, we feel it is imperative to assume our obligation to be
'independently responsible for safeguarding the rights of [our]
citizens. "260
This reasoning is most persuasive in the Mall of America
situation as there is only one Mall of America, and Minnesota is in
254. 473 N.W.2d 828, 837 (Minn. 1991).
255. See State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 1988).
256. See id. at 381 (citing Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970)). The Minnesota
Supreme Court focused on the fact that article I, section 6 of the state constitution states that
"[iun all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial
by an impartial jury ...." MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6. Additionally, article I, section 4
guarantees that "[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate ...." Id. § 4.
257. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d at 382.
258. Thiede v. Town of Scandia Valley, 14 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1944).
259. 418 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. 1988). See also supra note 231 and accompanying text.
260. Id. at 147 (quoting State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn. 1987)).
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the unique position of being home to what is undoubtedly the
world's most famous shopping mall. Thus, while other states have
malls that are facing problems with rowdy teenagers, 261 the Mall
of America, while not the first to implement a juvenile curfew,
262
is the largest and most well-known of the country's malls to have
done so. Only the Mall of America has two to three thousand
teenagers arriving at its doors on weekends nights, and only the
Mall of America has the funds and manpower to deal with the
situation on this scale.263 Finding a teen right of assembly at the
Mall would have a lasting effect on both teenagers' rights and
rights of assembly in Minnesota. It would also serve as persuasive
authority to other states in which mall managements are consider-
ing implementing such a curfew. The Mall of America is so well-
known and there is such widespread interest in it that when it
imposed the curfew, the decision was deemed newsworthy enough
to be written about in national newspapers across the country.
264
Surely a decision striking down the curfew as unconstitutional
would receive similar coverage and, thus, other mall managements
would be aware of it.
In order to make a constitutional argument for teenagers'
freedom of assembly rights at the Mall, the Minnesota Supreme
Court must ground such a right in the Minnesota Constitution. As
has been shown in Gray and its progeny, the court is willing to
extend individual liberties protections to those not enumerated in
the constitution under article I, section 16.265 Safeguarding the
rights of Minnesota citizens by assessing their evolving needs can
best be effectuated by granting an affirmative right to freedom of
261. Teresa McFarland states that she has taken calls from malls across the country
asking her how the Mall of America deals with unsupervised youth. See Taylor, supra note
172. See also Kokmen, supra note 7; Mall Execs Veto Curfews, LONG ISLAND Bus. NEWS,
Oct. 28, 1996, at 24; Peterson, supra note 27 (discussing teen problems at local malls as well
as the reticence on the part of the mall owners and lack of need to impose a curfew); Vick,
supra note 167.
262. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
263. See Meredith, supra note 7. The Mall's revenue was $675 million in 1994 alone. See
It's a Megamall World, supra note 128. Some of these monies could have been used to hire
more guards and install metal detectors. These are relatively simple safety precautions which
could easily be put in place and might obviate the need for the juvenile curfew.
264. For example, when the Mall announced that it was considering a juvenile curfew,
the news made the front page of The New York Times and was written about in The
Washington Post and The Chicago Tribune, arguably three of the most respected newspapers
in the United States. See supra notes 7, 27 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 229-32 and accompanying text.
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assembly at privately owned shopping malls that serve as public
downtowns. The court will do well to recognize the Mall of
America as a public arena and, as such, a place where First
Amendment-type freedoms should not to be denied. Once such a
right is grounded in the Minnesota Constitution, then the question
becomes whether the state's purpose can be achieved by using any
less intrusive methods.
B. Statutory Basis-The Minnesota Human Rights Act
As has been mentioned, there are many methods by which the
Mall of America's Parental Escort Policy can be challenged. While
this comment focuses mainly on the constitutional challenge to
freedom of assembly rights, other approaches may achieve greater
success. One of the alternative arguments, based on the Minnesota
Human Rights Act (the "Act"), is briefly discussed because it adds
a statutory basis to the constitutional and caselaw analysis discussed
above.
The Act was most recently revised by the Minnesota Legisla-
ture in 1980.266 The provision most applicable to the Mall situa-
tion is section 363.03(3) which deals with public accommodations.
Section 363.03(3) provides that it is "unfair discriminatory practice:
(1) to deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of
a place of public accommodation because of race, color, creed,
religion, disability, national origin, marital status, sexual orientation,
or sex . . ,,267 In the definitional section of the Act, a place of
public accommodation is defined as "a business, accommodation,
refreshment, entertainment, recreation, or transportation facility of
any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages or accommodations are extended, offered,
sold, or otherwise made available to the public. 2 68 Clearly, the
Mall of America satisfies the Act's definition of a place of public
accommodation. With 520 stores and numerous restaurants, clubs,
entertainment facilities, and even a hotel, the Mall qualifies as such
a place. Additionally, its goods are extended, offered, and sold to
the public at large.
266. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.01-20 (West 1991) (Minnesota Human Rights Act).
267. Id. § 363,03(3)(a)(1).
268. Id. § 363.01(33) (1991).
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Once held that the Mall of America is a place of public
accommodation under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, it must
be determined whether the Mall's Parental Escort Policy falls
within the scope of the public accommodations provision. On its
face, it appears that it does not. The provision mentions nothing
about age. The Parental Escort Policy, serving as a curfew at the
Mall of America, is based solely on an age requirement.269 In
order for the Minnesota Supreme Court to apply the Act to the
Parental Escort Policy, the court would have to determine that the
list enumerated in the Act is not exclusive. To take such action is
not beyond the bounds of the state supreme court's authority.
Indeed, as has been shown, the Minnesota Supreme Court has a
tradition of granting individual liberty protections not enumerated
in the state constitution. Furthermore, the Act itself states that
"[t]he provisions of this chapter shall be construed liberally for the
accomplishment of the purposes thereof., 27 ° The main purpose
of the Act is "to secure for persons in this state, freedom from
discrimination.
271
In one of the first cases in which a cause of action was brought
under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, the supreme court, in
United States v. McClure,272 discussed the long history of the
Minnesota anti-discrimination laws and the place they hold for the
people of the state. In 1897, 1905, 1943, 1965, and 1980, the
Minnesota Legislature showed a continued commitment to fighting
discrimination by revising and broadening its anti-discrimination
law. 273 As the court recognized, Minnesota's first anti-discrimina-
tion law in 1885 preceded the anything-but "separate but equal"
Jim Crow laws and was much more egalitarian than those laws.
27 4
The court then found that the United States Jaycees served as a
place of public accommodation and, as such, could not continue
granting unequal membership privileges to its male and female
269. An action against the Mall of America for racial discrimination is a strong claim
under the Act. See infra note 279 and accompanying text.
270. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.11.
271. Id.. § 363.12.
272. 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981). Based on the Minnesota Human Rights Act, the
court held that the Jaycees served as a place of public accommodation. See id. at 774.
Therefore, based on the Act's nondiscrimination provision relating to sex, the court held that
the organization could not grant fewer membership privileges to its female members than
those granted to its male members. See id.
273. See id. at 765-68.
274. See id. at 766-67.
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members. 275  The court engaged in an in-depth analysis of wheth-
er the Jaycees, a national organization, served as a place of public
accommodation.276 Using criteria from other jurisdictions, the
court determined that the Jaycees, a nonselective group with an
uncapped membership, did serve as a place of public accommoda-
277tion.
The same logic should be applied to the Mall of America's
curfew. The court should construe the statute liberally to consider
age as a factor under the Act. Due solely to the teenagers' age,
they are denied certain access to the Mall of America. The
Minnesota Supreme Court in United States Jaycees noted that
Minnesota's human rights laws have grown more inclusive with
each revision.278  An argument can and should be made for
realizing the intent behind this legislation by expanding the Act's
protections to include age discrimination. An analysis into the
Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretations of legislative acts, be
those interpretations strictly literal or broad in scope, would be
necessary in making this argument. Such analysis is beyond the
scope of this comment, but it is hoped that this comment succeeds
in laying the foundation for the myriad constitutional and statutory
challenges that may be brought against the Parental Escort Policy.
279
275. See id. at 774.
276. See id. at 768-72.
277. See United States Jaycees, 305 N.W.2d at 768-72.
278. See id. at 765-68.
279. Indeed, this comment is narrow in scope compared to the number of approaches that
can be taken in challenging the curfew. Again, the focus of this comment is to lay the
foundation in arguing for an individual liberty right of teenager assembly under the
Minnesota Constitution. However, there are numerous ways of challenging the validity of
the juvenile curfew. Following is a very brief overview of three alternative arguments for
challenging the Mall of America's Parental Escort Policy.
First, one of the strongest arguments which can be made is that the Parental Escort
Policy discriminates against black youth who only frequent the Mall in such large numbers
on weekend evenings. See Apgar, supra note 186; Meredith, supra note 7. While Mall
management has stated that it implemented the curfew as a colorblind measure, the effect
of the curfew undeniably affects black youth in greater numbers. See id. (noting President
of the Minneapolis Urban League, Gary Sudduth's outcry upon the curfew's implementa-
tion). Under the Federal Constitution, a discriminatory motive, and not just a discriminatory
effect, must be found in order for the cause of action to succeed. See Mayor of Washington,
D.C. v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). However, such a finding is not necessary under all state
laws. Hence, it would be worth studying further the Minnesota Human Rights Act and state
caselaw to determine whether a discriminatory motive must be present or whether a
discriminatory impact is sufficient for a finding of discrimination. If the curfew is found to
be discriminatory, as the evidence indicates, the next question is whether the stated non-
discriminatory intent is sufficient to sustain it in light of the discriminatory impact or whether
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V. Alternatives
After the New Jersey Supreme Court in New Jersey Coalition
had granted petitioners the right to leaflet at the defendants' malls,
the court stated:
There is concern, understandable concern, about the possibility
of confrontation, disturbance, and even violence--concerns not
just for business, but for the safety and security of people at the
premises. Freedom of speech has always had this potential,
controversy being part of its nature. Defendants' fears are not
fanciful, but this is hardly a novel problem. This country, and
its cities, and more to the point, its downtown business districts,
have successfully dealt with it and lived with it for centuries.
2
80
The court stated that the speech right granted-that of
distributing leaflets-was not likely to result in harm to the
the curfew is a pretext for discrimination.
Secondly, a due process argument under the Minnesota Constitution Rights and
Privileges Clause, should be explored. See MINN. CONST. art. I, § 2. The first sentence of
that provision states that "[n]o member of this state shall be disfranchised or deprived of any
of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land or the
judgment of his peers." Id.
In conjuction with a Minnesota due process claim, an argument may be made under
the state curfew regulations. Minnesota has a curfew regulation establishing that "a county
board may adopt an ordinance establishing a countywide curfew for unmarried persons under
18 years of age .. " MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145A.05(7)(2) (West Supp. 1997). An argument
may be made analogizing the Mall of America's Parental Escort Policy to municipal curfews
across the country. A number of the curfews have been invalidated due to the broadness
of their scope. By contrast, many of the curfews that have been upheld are more narrowly
tailored. An analogy can be made to the Mall of America situation by arguing that its
curfew is overboard and that the result desired by Mall management can be achieved with
more narrowly tailored means. See discussion infra Part V.
Third, a federal Fourteenth Amendment due process argument can also be raised in
conjunction with this state argument. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Under the Federal
Constitution, teens are not granted equal rights as compared to adults. See Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622 (1979), reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979). However, in a number of state cases
challenging local municipal juvenile curfew laws under both state and federal law, state
courts have been closely divided on whether juvenile curfews deny teens assembly and
association rights. Depending on whether the state court viewed teen assembly rights as
fundamental or as somewhat less, the courts used either heightened scrutiny or the rational
basis test to determine the constitutionality of a municipal curfew. See In re J.M., 768 P.2d
219 (Colo. 1989); Deerfield v. Greenberg, 550 N.E.2d 12 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); People v.
Chambers, 360 N.E.2d 55 (Ill. 1976); City of Maquoketa v. Russell, 484 N.W.2d 179 (Iowa
1992); Brown v. Ashton, 660 A.2d 447 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992); Bykofsky v. Middletown,
401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976).
280. New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650
A.2d 757, 782 (N.J. 1994).
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shopping centers or to the people inside them because that right
was "the least intrusive form of free speech and the easiest to
control., 28' The right this comment advocates, that of teen
assembly, is arguably higher up on the "intrusiveness" scale. There
is a justified concern about future violence in the Mall of America;
however, there are practical alternatives to the juvenile curfew and
very strong public policy reasons why the Mall should use them
before turning to the Parental Escort Policy. The alternatives,
discussed herein, are less intrusive than the Parental Escort Policy
and may perhaps be even more effective in preserving the Mall as
a safe environment for all who enter. The two most prominent
public policy reasons for repealing the Parental Escort Policy are:
(1) to repair relations with the black community, and (2) to repair
relations with teen shoppers in general, a group with great spending
power and which has been alienated by the Mall's policy.
The first and most important reason for the Mall to reconsider
its policy is to regain the trust of the black community. Even
before the juvenile escort policy was implemented, members of the
black community believed that the Mall discriminated against low-
income black youth.282 These allegations were based on argu-
ments that Mall security discriminately handed-out the Mall's
Conduct Code more often to black youth as compared to white
youth; additionally, security allegedly approached more groups of
black teens than white teens. 283 Mall management has steadfastly
281. Id.
282. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
Given the Mall's earlier attempt to restrict bus access to its site, we can only
conclude that racism is playing a role here .... It seems to us that the Mall of
America believes that children of color will not have a parent-or a car-readily
available for their visit to the mall. Therefore, they believe, the new policy requir-
ing the presence of a parent will reduce the number of non-white young people
in the mall in the early evening.
Apgar, supra note 186 (quoting Gary Sudduth, President of the Minneapolis Urban League).
See also Taylor, supra note 172 (stating that "[t]he mall has been getting criticism from
members of the African-American community, who claim black youths are unduly harassed
[by mall security]").
There have been at least two discrimination suits filed by African Americans against
the Mall of America. First, three women filed a discrimination complaint against the Mall
in 1996 after their teenage daughters had a scuffle with Mall security. See Taylor, supra note
172; Margaret Zack, Cop Disciplined for Conduct in Megamall Arrest, MINNEAPOLIS-ST.
PAUL STAR-TRIB., May 4,1996. The suit was settled for $200,000. Second, in October 1995,
three different minority teens sued the Mall on their own behalf. See Taylor, supra note 172.
283. See Meredith, supra note 7. The article quotes Marcus Wilson, an 18 year-old black
teen who goes to the Mall on weekend nights, who stated that Mall security tend to give him
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held that its security implementation is colorblind,284 but the
introduction of the curfew, the practical effect of which is to keep
large groups of black teens out of the Mall on weekend nights, has
not convinced the black community that the curfew was not racially
motivated. Indeed, the only time such large numbers of black
teens go to the Mall is on weekend nights.
28 5
It can and should be argued that the Mall has a responsibility
to the community with which it has a symbiotic relationship. The
community has given the Mall its business while the Mall has
provided the surrounding area with thousands of jobs. 286  With
the Mall's prominence in the Bloomington/Minneapolis community
comes a responsibility to treat all those in the community with
respect. Even before it had opened the Mall had gained national
prominence, and the implementation of the Parental Escort Policy
was national news. 287 By its very existence, the Mall of America
has become the preeminent mall in America. With that reputation
comes the responsibility of being a role model. It may not be a
role the Mall management desired, but it has become the Mall's
role nonetheless. 28 8 With the concern voiced by the Minneapolis
Urban Coalition and the Urban League, the Mall would show its
continuing commitment to social problems by recognizing the race
issue and by effecting another policy that would not have such a
disproportionate effect on the area's black youth. By implementing
an alternative to the curfew that is more egalitarian in nature, the
Mall would best effectuate this commitment and set an example
which would be seen by the rest of the country.
The second reason for the Mall to rescind its Parental Escort
Policy flows somewhat from the first. Malls across the country are
watching the Mall of America's juvenile curfew to discern whether
a copy of the Conduct Code when he enters the mall; by contrast, white teenagers are rarely
handed copies of the Code. See id.
284. See McFarland Interview, supra note 16.
285. See Meredith, supra note 7; Telephone Interview with Yusef Mgeni, President of the
Urban Coalition in the Twin Cities (Sept. 25, 1996).
286. The Mall of America employs approximately 12,000 people. See AT A GLANCE,
supra note 1.
287. See supra notes 7, 27 and accompanying text.
288. Famous people and places, such as the Mall of America, are closely watched by the
media and the country at large. This should make them aware that their actions (or
inaction) are observed and that they have the tremendous power of setting as good an
example as a poor one.
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such a policy is effective.289 The Mall would set an example as to
the treatment of all teenagers were it to end its policy of welcoming
them on weekend evenings only with a parental escort. As one
commentator has noted, the curfew might solve the Mall's
problems, but it also "might unnecessarily damage its relationship
with teens and reinforce negative stereotypes of them., 29° Teens
do not have as many rights as adults do in this country, but the
Mall would set an example as to how to treat teens with greater
respect were it to institute an alternative to the curfew that would
achieve similar results as the curfew. The best way to ask teens to
act like responsible adults may be to treat them in a more adultlike
fashion.2 91
This objective could perhaps be best effectuated if the Mall
began using the state Unlawful Assembly and Disorderly Conduct
statutes at its disposal.292 Rather than denying access to a whole
class of people, the vast majority of whom are innocent of any
wrongdoing, the Mall should deny access to the few who display
poor conduct. The Mall could replace the information about the
Parental Escort Policy on the Conduct Code handout with a
warning that state statutes will be used to keep violators off the
premises. The statutes alone can in fact be used to keep perpetra-
tors out of the Mall. As has hopefully been proven in this
comment, the behavior of the majority of the teens is consistent
with Mall policy. As the New Jersey Supreme Court in New Jersey
289. See supra notes 27, 261 and accompanying text.
290. Teen Curfews-Paterson Should Think Twice Before Acting, THE RECORD (Bergen
County, N.J.), Sept. 12, 1996.
291. With the Parental Escort Policy, the Mall of America has effectively alienated many
members of the teen population. While Mall management argues that most of the teens who
go to the Mall on weekend nights do not go there for shopping, teens in general have a
tremendous amount of spending power in this country. Were other malls across the country
to follow the Mall of America's example, they could find themselves effectively closing off
a large source of revenue. According to Teenage Research Unlimited, teenage spending in
the United States is estimated at over $100 billion annually. See Kokmen, supra note 7. In
the same article, Mark Schoifet, Spokesman for the International Council of Shopping
Centers, states that "nobody in our industry wants to alienate this group .... They grow
into adults, and they are the people you want as your loyal customers. Ninety nine point
nine percent of kids are good kids .... But sometimes dealing with teenagers is a difficult
dilemma for mall managers." Id.
292. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.705 (West 1987) (Unlawful Assembly); see also id.
§ 609.72 (West Supp. 1997) (Disorderly Conduct). Under the disorderly conduct statute, one
is guilty of disorderly conduct if one "engages in offensive, obscene, abusive, boisterous, or
noisy conduct or in offensive, obscene, or abusive language tending reasonably to arouse
alarm, anger, or resentment in others." Id.
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Coalition states, simply "hanging around" the Mall is allowed.293
It is only those who are violent who should not be allowed in the
Mall.294 The Mall would set an example that violent and disruptive
behavior is not tolerated by having the offending teens arrested.
Therefore, the violent teens, and the teens who congregate in large
groups which act as a public nuisance, would be on notice that their
behavior will not be tolerated by the Mall or by society. The latter
group, which is the more prevalent group at the Mall, should not
be banned. Rather, it is those groups that are especially large in
number or loud in their behavior who should be asked to split up
into smaller, less obtrusive groups. The failure to do so would
result in arrest. While this sounds like a harsh remedy for teens
who are only gathered in large groups, after such a remedy is
imposed once, it is not likely to be necessary again. Using state
statutes to police the Mall would perhaps be the most effective
method of keeping violent teens out of the Mall while at the same
time informing others that such behavior will not be condoned.
The Mall has repeatedly conceded that most of the kids who
go to the Mall on weekend nights are good kids. 295 A safe
environment need not be achieved at the expense of denying the
well-behaved teens access to the Mall; this is the practical effect of
the Parental Escort Policy. Nor will keeping the well-behaved
teens from the Mall serve to make the Mall a safer environment.
If safety is the Mall's objective, an effort should be made to at all
times restrict permanent Mall access to the teenagers who have
exhibited violent behavior on Mall premises. A violent incident
may occur at 5 p.m. on a Saturday or perhaps 1 p.m. on a Wednes-
day when teenagers are on school vacation. Banning violent teens
from the Mall altogether will have the lasting effect of making the
Mall safer at all times rather than only on weekend evenings.
Implementing this policy would require distributing pictures and
names of violators to Mall security and instructing Mall security to
deny access to those teens. Security should also be authorized to
arrest as a trespasser any teen gaining access to the Mall who has
been a perpetrator of a violent incident at the Mall. While this
approach may seem difficult in practice, Mall security now requests
293. See New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp.,
650 A.2d 757, 773 (N.J. 1994).
294. The issue of prior restraint, while pertinent to this topic, is beyond the scope of this
comment.
295. See supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
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identification of all people thought to be under the age of sixteen.
To request identification of those individuals thought to be
perpetrators of Mall violence is far less intrusive than asking every
teen for identification. 96
Indeed, perhaps the most egalitarian method of insuring Mall
safety would be the installation of metal detectors at each Mall
entrance. This would have the effect of not only banning teens
with weapons, but it would keep all persons with weapons out of
the Mall. While this measure may sound harsh, suggestive of
airport metal detectors and dangerous inner-city schools, metal
detectors will do the best job of keeping all concealed weapons off
Mall premises. If Mall patrons are concerned about their safety,
they should tolerate the minor inconvenience of removing their
keys and passing through the detector. The effect of using metal
detectors would be to keep all weapons out of the Mall and not
just those that teenagers carry. If a seventeen year-old were to
bring a gun to the Mall, the teen would be denied entrance under
this policy. Conversely, under the Parental Escort Policy, entrance
would be granted once identification proving age over sixteen was
shown.
Lastly, hiring more Mall security and strictly enforcing the
Conduct Code would in all likelihood alleviate the problem of teen
violence.2 97 At least one other mall has found success by strictly
enforcing its conduct code and ejecting violators for anywhere from
thirty days to one year from mall premises.29 Granted, no other
mall can compare in size to the Mall of America, but most of the
teens at the Mall of America do not pose a safety threat. As Mall
spokeswoman Teresa McFarland herself has said, the majority of
teens at the Mall are well-behaved, and it is the minority who spoil
it for the majority.299
296. See supra note 291 and accompanying text. This editorial compares the Mall of
America curfew with a proposed teen curfew in Paterson, New Jersey and suggests that both
the Mall of America and Paterson can achieve their goals without imposing curfews. See id.
The editorial recommends banning the teens who cause problems, rather than asking for
identification from every teen attempting to enter the Mall. See id.
297. This alternative would be most effective if implemented in conjunction with other
alternatives previously discussed.
298. See Peterson, supra note 27 (quoting David Groom, General Manager of the Mon-
mouth Mall in Eatontown, New Jersey).
299. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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Mall security already has an active community component in
place with the Youth Liaison Program. 00 The Mighty Moms and
Dedicated Dads also serve as an effective link to the community
because the moms and dads live in the same areas as many of the
teens. However, the Mall could do more within the community
before implementing the curfew. One step should be working with
community centers and perhaps religious organizations in order to
provide alternatives to going to the Mall on weekend nights.
Indeed, one reason so many teens go to the Mall of America may
be that they have nowhere else to go in the Bloomington/Minne-
apolis area on weekend nights. The Mall could take the initiative
to work with local groups to plan alternate, safe events for
teenagers. As many of the teens go to the Mall on weekend nights
only to be with one another, it is likely that they would be
interested in another place that provided a space to relax with
friends, especially one where they could comfortably hang-out in
large groups. Since such a venue would welcome large groups of
teens, this could become an attractive alternative for many
Minnesota teens. Community centers and religious houses could
offer their spaces on a rotating basis. Perhaps for a minimum
entrance fee special events, such as a dance or a comedy night,
would be offered.
VI. Affirmative Defenses
The strongest argument to be made by the Mall of America on
behalf of the Parental Escort Policy is that the policy works to
promote a safe environment.3 1 The number of arrests at the
Mall has decreased dramatically.3 2 Once the Mall is determined
to serve as a downtown area such that its actions constitute state
action, the Mall will likely defend the policy by stating that the
policy is in the best interests for the health, safety, and welfare of
300. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
301. After the first weekend that the Parental Escort Policy was put into effect, Mall
management stated that "[tihe policy is working exactly as we intended. More families came
out to enjoy the mall and it was a safer atmosphere for everyone. This was the first weekend
in memory where we didn't have a fight between kids." October Press Release, supra note
184.
302. From January through October 1996, 394 arrests were made at the Mall. From the
time the Juvenile Curfew Policy went into effect through June 1997, there has been only one
arrest. See Gupta, supra note 198.
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Minnesota citizens. While the Mall should be concerned about
safety, the fact that a safety interest is involved is not dispositive of
the constitutionality of the action. As the Minnesota Supreme
Court stated in Hershberger, "[m]erely because public safety is
articulated as a competing interest in section 16, however, does not
establish that interest as paramount. '303 In relation to the Mall
of America, once the court determines that the curfew is state
action, the question then becomes whether the state's interest in
protecting the safety of its citizens at the Mall can be achieved in
an equally effective method that is less violative of individual rights.
The author of this comment is fully aware that teen assembly rights
have not traditionally been of equal constitutional concern as
freedom of religious expression, 3 4 search and seizure rights,
3°5
or the bodily integrity of the mentally ill. °" While stretching the
bounds of constitutional concern, this comment argues that the
Minnesota courts can and should draw on their rich history of
caselaw to require less restrictive alternatives before a right so
fundamental as freedom of assembly is infringed. As best evi-
denced by Hershberger, as well as by E.D.J. and Jarvis, Minnesota
places a high premium on individual liberties. The court would
hopefully consider the previously discussed alternatives to the
curfew and hold that the Mall's safety objective could be effect-
uated in such a way that would serve the goal of keeping the Mall
safe for all its patrons without the need to resort to a Parental
Escort Policy.
After the safety argument, the Mall's second line of defense
may rely on article I, section 13 of the Minnesota Constitution
which provides that "[p]rivate property shall not be taken,
destroyed or damaged for public use without just compensation
therefor, first paid or secured. ' '3°7 The United States Supreme
Court addressed this argument in PruneYard, holding that the
rights of free expression and petition did not amount to an
unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause.38 The court stated that "[tihere is nothing to suggest that
303. State v. Hershberger 462 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Minn. 1990).
304. See id. at 393-400.
305. See In re Welfare of E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779 (Minn. 1993).
306. See Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. 1988).
307. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13.
308. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980). See also U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
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preventing appellants from prohibiting this sort of activity will
unreasonably impair the value or use of their property as a
shopping center. ' '3 °9 Indeed, the Mall of America did not state
that the few gun-related incidents had in any way diminished the
Mall's revenue. Thus, it cannot be argued that the implementation
of the curfew has restored lost business to the Mall. The Mall
stated that it had received complaints from shoppers that they
found the large groups of teens to be intimidating, but again, the
Mall had no statistics indicating that business was down due to the
congregating teens. The Mall has not argued that it has lost
business or revenue on account of the teenagers' actions, and this
line of argument would in all likelihood fail when compared to the
great benefit the Mall has obtained by making itself so accessible
to the general public.31 °
VII. Conclusion
As one individual has said: "[N]o place can shut out the
depressing realities of our new, uncivil society. If the promise of
the Mall of America was to seal off the tumult of the outside
world, that is a promise no enterprise can likely keep." ''
A balance must be struck between respecting the Mall of
America's need to maintain a safe environment and teenagers' right
of assembly in the Mall. Mall of America's management has made
many efforts to curb teen violence and teen congregating on Mall
premises. Mall management has shown a commitment to dealing
with this situation; however, further steps could and should have
been taken before the Mall instituted its Parental Escort Policy.
The policy is too broad in its scope and keeps out the many good
teens in order to deny access to the few who misbehave. Under
the Minnesota Constitution, a strong argument can be made for
309. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 83.
310. A counterpart to the takings argument is that the Mall, as private property, has a
right to exclude. An analysis of this argument is beyond the scope of this comment.
However, it is worth noting that while the Mall does have a right to exclude in order to
make its premises safer, it can achieve this goal by excluding only those teens who are
violent and violate the Conduct Code, which is a class much narrower than those now
affected under the Parental Escort Policy.
311. Greene, supra note 10.
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recognizing teenagers' assembly rights at the Mall of America. It
is intended that this comment serve as a starting point for bringing
such a constitutional challenge.
Alysa B. Freeman
